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All concurred in this, and Thomas telegraphed Grant thathe felt compelled to wait till the storm should break, butwould submit without a murmur if it was thought necessaryto relieve him. On the 13th, General Logan, who, it willbe remembered, was temporarily absent from the Fifteenth Corps , was ordered to Nashville for the purpose of super-seding Thomas in command of the Department and Army ofthe Cumberland, and Grant himself was on the way therealso, when the result of the first day of the battle of Nash-ville (December 15th) stopped further action in that direc-tion.
As early as December 6th, the troops had been ordered tobe ready to move against the enemy, and the plan of battleafterward adopted had been in substance determined. Fromday to day Hood appeared to be taking ground to the east,so as to bring himself more closely into support of Forrest’soperations. This led to a suggestion to Thomas from hiscorps commanders to modify his plan which had looked tothe use of the Twenty-third Corps to demonstrate on theleft, and give more weight to an attack by the right. Fromthe 8th to the 14th, it was definitely understood in campthat an attack would be made the moment the ice melted,and on the date last mentioned a warm rain made it certainthe ground would be bare next day. The position of Hoodhad not materially changed for a week. Chalmers wasoperating with a division of cavalry along the Cumberland,for some miles below Nashville , as Buford was above; but,while ordinary steamboat transportation was thus inter-rupted, the navy patrolled the river and prevented the enemyfrom crossing. Hood had sent a detachment of cavalry also,supported by Cockrell’s brigade of infantry to the mouth ofDuck Biver, on the Tennessee , to blockade that stream also,if possible. In his anxiety to cover so large a territory, the