THE PURSUIT AFTER THE BATTLE.

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erate to his subordinates. He had the personal couragewhich would be ashamed of its own display as much as of acowardice, but which seemed simply oblivious of dangerwhen duty required a risk to be taken. These qualitiesmade him always a trusted lieutenant to his chief, and werethe basis of an affectionate and respectful attachment in hisown army which was peculiar. His real and unaffectedaversion to taking the chief responsibility of command hadkept him in secondary positions when his rank in both theregular and volunteer armies would have made him thehead of a separate army in the field. In this respect he wasnot unlike Hardee, in the Confederate Army, who alsosteadily refused a supreme command. The duties of thesoldier, and the exhibition of courage and skill in makingthe details of a campaign successful, were easy to him ; butto become the theme of discussion in Congress and in thenewspapers, to be the butt of ten thousand public critics,and to carry the burden of plans whose failure might beruin to the country—this he hated so heartily and shrunkfrom so naturally, that, after all his long experience, wehave seen him protesting that the position assigned him inthis last campaign was “the one thing he did not want.”That these qualities in some degree unfitted him for an in-dependent command cannot be questioned. The very anx-iety to be right, if it is excessive, produces hesitation inaction and timidity in plan. Under such conditions thestimulus from without, coming in the form of urgency fromthe Government and command from the General-in-Chief,may not have been wholly unwelcome, and unquestionablyadded vigor to the final movements.

It is, however, in the earlier part of the campaign that thesteps taken were most open to question, though very few ofthe officers and men who served there had any exact knowl-