LOGIC.

3 17

r ''y follows, viz. that man is accountable for his actions. Here‘lien we have a complete act ot' reasoning, in which, according to"hat has been already observed, there are three distinct judge-ments; two that mav be styled previous, inasmuch as they lead to.he other, and arise from comparing the middle idea with the twomeas in the question; the third is a consequence of these previoushets, and flows from combining the extreme ideas between them-^lyes. If now we put this reasoning into words, it exhibits wiiaimgicians term a syllogism ; and, when proposed in due form, ru s: “ Plvery creature possessed of reason and liberty is accounf-for hi s actions: man is a creature possessed of reason and li-berty; therefore man is accountable for his actions.” In this syl-‘°gism we may observe, that there are three several propositions^pressing the three judgements implied in the act of reasoning;""d so disposed, as to represent distinctly what passes within thej! 1! nd in tracing the more distant relations of its ideas. The twolr »t propositions answer the two previous judgements in reasoning,“"'d are called the premises, because they are placed before themer. The third is termed the conclusion, as being gained in"miseunenee of w hat was asserted in the premises. We are also tom'lembcr, that the terms expressing the two ideas whose relations'j enquire after, as here man and accountableness, are in general'died the extremes; and that the intermediate idea, by means of■iich the relation is (raced, viz. a creature possessed of reasonmid liberty, lakes the name of the middle-term, lienee it fol-that "by the premises of a syllogism we are always to under-yand the two propositions where the middle-term is severally com-r'H'ed with the extremes; for these constitute the previous judge-tl et ds, whence the truth we are in quest of, is by reasoning de-Uc< :d. The conclusion is that other proposition, in which the^trenies themselves are joined or separated agreeably to what ap-eears upon the above comparison. The conclusion is made updie extreme terms .of the syllogism: and the extreme, whichr Ves as the predicate of the conclusion, goes by the name of the' / J°c term: the other extreme, which makes the subject in the0 (!"® proposition, is called the minor term. From this distinction'eli* extremes arises also a distinction between the premises,t er ere these extremes are severally compared with the middle-^ IT1 - That proposition which compares the greater extreme, orth e l >re .d*cate of the conclusion, with the middle-term, is calledi s m yor proposition: the other, wherein the same middle-term; s ^'^pared with the subject of the conclusion or less extreme,l 0 ^. a ‘ e d the minor proposition. All this is obvious from the syl-already given, where the conclusion is, Man is accountableti g >ls actions. For here the predicate accountable for his ac-befog connected with the middle term in the first of the twocoi every creature possessed of reason and liberty is ac-tig n ta ‘defer his actions, gives what we call the major proposi-0 /T, hi tfie second of the premises, man is a creature possessedO™ and liberty, we find the lesser extreme, or subject of the"’lie Us,0n > viz. man, connected with the same middle-term,lt ls known to be the minor proposition. When a syllo-pl a ! S P ro posed in due form, the major proposition is alwayskiiic- *'rst, die minor next,' and the conclusion last. Thesean Premised, we mav, in the general, deline reasoning to heti(, n 0r °P* ration of the mind, deducing some unknown proposi-prt;-,/ 011 ' other previous ones that are evident and known. Thesen tiii'ibl llS Impositions, in a simple act of reasoning are only two inP'tfonff ’ ai ’d is always required that they he of themselves ap-cei V( ! t L° understaiicling, insomuch that we assent to and per-giv etl .( truth of them as soon as proposed. In the syllogismetli,. ove > the premises are supposed to be self-evident truths;r eas 0n V . ls '‘ the conclusion could not be inferred by a single act ots es$ et [ lll S- If, for instance, in the major, “ every creature pos-c 0nil reason and liberty is accountable for his actions,” theCeiv t( j i' on between the subject and predicate could not be per-that tp- a bare attention to the ideas themselves; it is evidentc bisi 0c ,P rH P os ition would no less, require a proof than the con-s ° u ght f et uced from it. In this case a new middle-term must bec °lirse r'’ *° 'race the connection here supposed; and this, of'he prim l, ” 1 . ls be_s another syllogism, by which, having established'o "se it - S1 * lon ' n question, we are then, and not before, at libertyl 'appe n f!' an )' succeeding train of reasoning. And should it soP r °positi Q ,' n 'k' s second essay there was still some previous"or ,,, n " 10se truth did not appear at first sight, we must then■ ***•—no. tt!7.

have recourse to a third syllogism, to lay open that truth to the-mind: because so long as the premises remain uncertain, the con-clusion built upon them must be so too. When, by conductingour thoughts in this manner, we at last arrive at some syllogismwhere the previous propositions are intuitive truths; the mindthen rests in full security ; as perceiving that the several conclu-sions it has passed through stand upon the immoveable foundationsof self-evidence, and when traced to their source terminate in it.We see, therefore, that, to infer a conclusion by a single art ofreasoning, the premises must be inliiitive propositions. Wherethey are not, previous syllogisms are required; in which case reason-ing becomes a complicated act, taking in a variety of successivesteps, 'l'his frequently happens in tracing the more remote rela-tion of our ideas; where, many middle-terms being called in, theconclusion cannot be made out but in consequence of a series ofsyllogisms following one another in train. But although in thisconcatenation of propositions, those that form the premises of thelast syllogism are often considerably removed from self evidence ;yet if we trace the reasoning backwards, we shall find them theconclusions of previous syllogisms, whose premises approachnearer and nearer to intuition in proportion as we advance, and arefound at last to terminate in it. And if, after having thus unravel-led a demonstration, we take it the contrary way; and observehow the mind, setting out with intuitive perceptions, couples themtogether to form a conclusion; how by introducing this conclu- .sion into another syllogism, it still advances ope step farther; andso proceeds, making every new discovery subservient to its futureprogress; we shall then perceive clearly, that reasoning, in thehighest sense of that faculty, is no more than an orderly combina-tion of those simple acts which w'e have already so fully explained.All the aims of human reason may, in general, be reduced to thesetwo: 1. To rank things under those universal ideas to which theytruly belong; and, 2. To ascribe to them their several attributesand properties, in consequence of that distribution. Thereforethe determining of die genera and species of things is a necessary-exercise of human reason, the first in order, and previous to theother, which consists in ascribing to them their powers, properties,and relations. But w hen we have taken this previous step, andbrought particular objects under general names; as the propertiesw'e ascribe to them are other than those of the general idea, it isplain that, in order to a successful progress in this part of know-ledge, w'e must thoroughly acquaint ourselves with the several re-lations and attributes ot these our general ideas. The relations ofour general ideas are of two kinds: either such as immediately dis-cover themselves, upon comparing the ideas one with another; orsuch as, being more remote and distant, require art and contriv-ance to bring them into view. The relations of the first kind fur-nish us with intuitive and self-evident truths: tho>e of the secondare traced by reasoning, and due application of intermediate ideas.As, therefore, in tracing the more distant relations of things, wemust always have recourse to intervening ideas, and arc more orless successful in our researches according to our acquaintancewith these ideas, and ability of applying them ; it is evident that,to make a good reasoner, two tilings are prim ipally required. 1st,An extensive know ledge of those intermediate ideas, by means ofwhich things may be compared one with another. 2d,'1 he skilland talent of applying them happily in all particular instances thatcome under consideration'. In order to our Mieccsstul progress inreasoning, we must have an extensive knowledge of those interme-diate ideas by means of winch things may he compared one withanother. For as it is not every idea that will answer the purposeof our inquiries, but such only as are peculiarly related u> the ob-jects about which we reason, so as, by a comparison with them, tofurnish evident and known truths; nothing is more apparent titanthat the greater variety of com options we can ra.ll into view, themore likely we are to find some among them that will help us lothe truths here required. And, indeed, it holds in experience,that in proportion as we enlarge our views ot things, ami grew ac-quainted with a multitude of different objects, the reasoning fa-culty gathers strength: for, h_v extending our sphere o! know-ledge, the mind acquires a certain force and penetration, as beingaccustomed to examine the several appearances oi its ideas, andobserve what light they cast one upon another. This is the reason"hv, in order to excel remarkably in any one branch of ler-nsing,it is necessary to have, at least, a general aeqtta ittance with the4 M whole