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METAPHYSICS.

METAPHYSICS.

METAPHYSICS, a science which treats of beings and ofwhatever belongs to then) abstractedly in their own simple natures.Aristotle , after treating on physics, begins his next book (in whichhe pretends to elevate the mind above cbrporeal objects, to fix iton the contemplation of God , of angels, and of tilings spiritual,and"to enable it to judge of the principles of sciences by abstrac-tion) with the Greek words juim ™ fwrixa, post physicam, t. e.after physics. His disciples, and succeeding philosophers, haveformed, of these two, one word, metaphysics. This science,which is frequently called ontology, investigates and explains thenature and general essence of all beings, as well as the qualitiesand attributes that essentially appertain to them, and which weought to assign them by abstraction, as considering them apriori. Hence this doctrine should proceed in its operations fromthe most simple ideas; such as do not admit of any other qualitiesof which they may be compounded. These simple ideas arethose of being, of essence, of substance, of mode, of existence, aswell with regard to time as place, of a necessary cause, of unity,the idea of negation, the difference between beings that are sim-ple or compound, necessary or accidental, finite or infinite; the;idea of essential and abstract properties, as of the greatness, per-fection, and goodness, of beings; and so of the rest. The use,therefore, of ontology, is to make us acquainted with every kindof being in its essence and abstract qualities, aiid such as are dis-tinct f*sm all other beings. This knowledge being once establish-ed on simple principles, just consequences may thence be drawn,and those things proved after which the metaphysician inquires,and which it is his object to prove. It is easy to conceive, thateven a clear knowledge of beings, and their essential properties,Would be still defective and useless toman, if he did not knowhow to determine and fix his ideas by proper denominations, andconsequently to communicate his perceptions to those whom hewould instruct, or against whom he is obliged to dispute, as theywould not have the same perceptions that he has. It is, perhaps,one of the greatest advantages that we have over other animals, tobe able so to determine our ideas by signs or denominations, ei-ther of writing or speech, as to refer each particular perceptionto its general idea, and every general perception to its par-ticular idea. To render, therefore, our ideas intelligible toothers, we have determinate words or names for each being, andthe qualities of each being; and ontology teaches us those termswhich are so necessary to fix our ideas, and to give them the re-quisite perspicuity and precision, that we may not dispute aboutwords when we endeavour to extend the sphere of our knowledge,or w hen we debate concerning the essence of an object, or endea-vour to make it more evident. For this reason ontology wasformerly regarded as a barren science, that consisted of technicalterms only ; as a mere terminology : whereas the best modernphilosophers make it a more substantial science, by annexing de-terminate ideas to those words, and the examination of those ob-jects themselves that these terms imply. But the misfortune is,that in this ontologic determination there is still much uncertainly,and sophistry. For, in the first place, we yet know of no meta-physics where all the definitions arc just; and, secondly, the wordsthat are employed in these definitions have always something equi-vocal in their meaning, and have consequently themselves needof definitions; and in this manner we may recede to infinity, un-less we recur to the first impressions that the simple word? havemade in our minds, and the primitive ideas which they there ex-cite. The words man, love, coach, &e. say more, and make astronger impression, than all the definitions we can give of them ;by ontologic explications they are almost always covered with adark cloud. When this science is applied to particular beings, orto a particular class of beings, it conies under different denomina-tions. Thus it make's a part of co-niology when it examines into(he essence of the world, and all that "it contains; its naturallaws; of (lie nature of matter; of motion; of the nature of tamd-Wft bodies, of their’attributes and essential qualities, and of all that 1

can be known by abstraction, and sometimes also by adding t lClights that man acquires concerning them by the experience ot n*»senses. It is a branch of anthroposophy, or anthropology, whenit is applied to the metaphysical examination of man, his existence,his essence, his essential qualities and necessary attributes, all const'tiered a priori; and this examen leads to another branch. Psy-chology, which consists in the knowledge of the soul in general,and oi the soul of man in particular; concerning which the mostprofound, the most subtile and abstract researches have been made,that the human reason is capable of producing; and concerningthe substance of which, in spite of all the efforts, it is yet ex-tremely difficult to assert any thing that is rational, and still l et ’any thing that is positive and well supported.

Of Ideas in General, and their Originals.

Mr. Locke ’s Essay on the Human Understanding ranks high a 3a treatise on Metaphysics; we shall present a short abstract from th ,!twork. By the term idea, as defined by Mr. Locke , is meant what'ever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, °rwhatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking-To trace the manner by- which we acquire these ideas, let us su]>'pose the mind to be, as we say whitepaper, void of all characters,without any ideas: how comes it to be furnished ? whence has i*all the materials of reason and knowledge? From experience andobservation. This, when employed about external sensible ob-jects, we may call sensation ; by this we have the ideas of bitter,sweet, yellow, hard, &c. which are commonly called sensiblequalities, because conveyed into the mind by the senses. Th®same experience, when employed about the internal operationsthe mind, perceived and reflected on by us, we may call reflection»hence we have the ideas of perception, thinking, doubting, willing’,reasoning, &c. These two, viz. external material things as tb eobjects of sensation, and the operations of our own minds as th*objects of reflection, are the only originals whence all o' lfideas lake their beginnings; the understanding seems not to bar®the least glimmering of ideas, which it doth not receive from oH eof these two sources. These, when we have taken a full surveyof them ami their several modes and compositions, we shallto contain our whole stock of ideas: and that we have nothing b*our minds which did not come in one of these two ways. Wl' ena man first perceives, then he may be said to have ideas; havingideas, and perception, signifying the same thing.

■ Of Simple Ideas.

Of ideas, some are simple, others complex. A simple idea>*one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, which is n otdistinguishable into different ideas. Such are the ideas of sens 1 'ble qualities whirl), though they arc in the. things themselves s9united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance betw® cl>them, yet the ideas tliev produce in the mind enter by the sens®*simple and unniixed. Tims, though the hand feels softness aiwwarmth in the same piece of wax, yet the simple ideas thus ihiU(‘in the Same subject are as perfectly distinct as those that coin 6 inby different senses. These simple ideas are suggested no olb®Jway than from the two ways above-mentioned, viz. sensation s> .reflection. The mind being once stored with simple ideas,the power to compare, repeat, and unite, all these differ® 1 ’ 1ideas to an infinite variety; and so can make, at pleasure*new complex ideas. But the most enlarged understandij’®of man cannot frame one new simple idea ; nor by any force u c "; stroy those that are there. Ideas, with reference"to the differ® 1 ’

| ways wherein they approach the mind, are of four sorts; I s ,There are some which come into our minds bv one sense om?',‘Ally, There are others conveyed into tlte mind by morethan one. 3dly, Others that are had from reflection "only. 4tbl>'»There are some suggested to the mind by all the ways of sensat' 0 *and reflection. ...