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f 0 “nd the names belonging to different senses, and call a colourthe name of a taste. Complex ideas are much more liable to■dsehood in this particular ; and those of mixed modes more than""stances; because in substances, their sensible qualities serve,‘ or the most part, to distinguish them clearly; but in mixed"'odes we are more uncertain, and we may call that justice which° ll glit to be called oppression. The reason of this is, that the ab-®d'act ideas of mixed modes being men’s voluntary combinationj s "ch a precise collection of simple ideas, we have nothing elseto refer our ideas of mixed modes or standards to, but the ideasthose who are thought to use names in their proper significa-"°"s; and so far as our ideas conform or differ from them, theyPass tor true or false. As to the second, when wc refer our ideasthe real existence of things, none can be termed false hut our" u >np!ex ideas ot substances: for our simple ideas being nothing"" perceptions in us, answerable to certain powers in external"ejects, their truth consists in nothing but such appearances as areProduced in us, suitable to those powers: neither do they become.'able to the imputation of falsehood, whether we judge these"'"as to be in the thing? themselves, or not; for God having set"(em as marks of distinguishing things, that we may be able todiscern one thing from another, and thereby choose them as we'ave occasion, it alters not the nature of our simple ideas, whetherthink the idea of blue (for instance) to be in the violet itself, or1,1 the mind only: and it is equally from that appearance to hedenominated blue, whether it be that real colour, or only a pe-f-hliar texture in it, that causes in us that idea; since the name"die notes properlv nothing but that mark of distinction that is ina violet, discernible only by our eyes, whatever it consists in.
cither would our simple ideas be false, if by the different slruc-"'re of our organs it were so ordered that the same object shouldProduce in several men’s minds different ideas: for this couldnever be known, since objects would operate constantly after the^me manner. It is most probable, nevertheless, that the ideasProduced by the same objects in different men’s minds are very"car and undiscernibly like. Names of simple ideas may be mis-applied ; as a man, ignorant in the English tongue, may call pur-P "> scarlet: but this makes no falsehood in the idea. Complex"leas of modes cannot be false, in reference to the essence of anytiling really existing; because they have no reference to anv pat-'"rn existing, or made by nature. Our complex ideas of sub-stances, being all referred to patterns in tilings themselves, may healse. They are so, 1st, When looked upon as representations of."unknown essences of things: 2dly, When they put together""pie ideas which in the real existence of things have no union;", 3 >n Centaur. 3dly, When from any collection of simple ideas,do not always exist together, there is separated, by direct ne-Ration, any one simple idea which is constantly joined with them.* His, if from extension, solidity, fixedness, malleableness, fusi-l’'1'ty, &c. we remove the colour observed in gold: if this ideaonly left out of the complex one of gold, it is to be looked on?, s : »i inadequate and imperfect, rather than a false one; since'""gli it contains not all the simple ideas that are united in nature,yet■ ■ ■ .
" puts none together hut what do really exist together. Uponj e "'hole, our ideas, as they are considered by the mind, either
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""ds, simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless complex ideas,J'e.rein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other ideast re ‘" themselves light, and the knowledge about them right and"e knowledge. But when we come to refer them to any pat-n,s > or archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as fare y disagree with such archetypes.
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of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connec-r t > as 0|lt another. It is the office and excellency of ourcor,,' 1 to '"ace these, and hold (hem together in that union andthis e , s ,l 10u d L 'nce which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides° r cn-t re ' 3 . a,l0t her connection of ideas wholly owing to chanceb e S(J st0| ." • ideas that in themselves are not. at all a-kin, come totlj e L ""'ted in some men’s minds, that it is very hard to separate• they always keep company, and the one ao sooner comes
Of the Association of Ideas.
into the understanding, but its associate appears with it; and ifthey are more than two, the whole gang always inseparably shewthemselves together. This strong combination of ideas, not alliedby nature, the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or bychance: and hence it comes in different men to be very different,according to their different inclinations, educations, interests, &c.Custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well asof determining in the will, and of motions in the body ; all whichseem to be but trains of motion in the animal spirits, which, onceset a-going, continue on in the same steps they have been usedto; which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and themotion in it becomes easy, and, as it were, natural. As far aswe can comprehend thinking, ideas seem to he thus produced inour minds; or if they are not, this may serve to explain their fol-lowing one another in habitual train, when once they are put in-to that tract, as well as it does to explain such motions of the body;This connection in our minds of ideas, in themselves loose andindependent one of another, is of so great force to set us awry inour actions, moral as well as natural, passions, reasonings, andnotions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing thatdeserves more to be looked after.
Of Knowledge in General.
Since the mind, in ail its thoughts and reasonings, has no otherimmediate object but its own ideas, which alone it does or cancontemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversantabout them. Knowledge then seems to be nothing hut the per-^ception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and re-pugnancy of any of our ideas: where this perception is, there isknowledge; and where it is not, there, though we fancy, guessor believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. \Vhen weknow that white is not black, what do we but perceive that thesetwo ideas do not agree? Or that the three angles of a triangle areequal to two right ones; what do we more but perceive thatequality to two right ones does necessarily agree to, and is inse-parable from, the three angles of a triangle? But to understand alittle more distinctly wherein this agreement or disagreement con-sists, we may reduce it all to these four sorts: 1st, Identity ordiversity ; 2dly, Relation ; 3dly, Coexistence ; 4thly, RealExistence.
I. Identity or Diversity. It is the first act of the mind toperceive its ideas; and, so far as it perceives them, to know eachwhat it is, and thereby to perceive their difference, that is, theone not to he the other: by this the mind clearly perceives eachidea to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct ideasto disagree. This it does without any pains or deduction, by itsnatural power of perception and distinction. This is what men ofart have reduced to those general rules, viz. What is, is; and, Itis impossible for the same thing at the same time to be and not tolie. But no maxim can make a man know it clearer, that roundis not square, than the hare perception of those two ideas, whichtlie mind at first sight perceives to disagree.
II. The next sort of agreement or disagreement the mind per-ceives in any of its ideas may be called Relative, and is nothingbut tlie perception of the relation between any two ideas of whatkind soever; that is, their agreement or disagreement one withanother in several ways the mind takes of comparing them.
III. The third sort of agreement or disagreement to be foundin our ideas is Co-existence or Non-existence in the same subject;and this belongs particularly to substances. Thus, when we pro-nounce concerning gold, that it is fixed; it amounts to no morebut this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire uncon-sumed, is an idea that always accompanies that particular sort ofyellowness, weight, fusibility, &c. which make out- complex ideasignified by the word gold.
IV. The fourth sort is that of Actual and Real Existence agree-ing to any idea. Within these lour sorts of agreement or disagree-ment is contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of.For all that we know or can affirm concerning any idea, is, Thatit is, or is not, the same with some other; as, that blue is not yel-low : That it does, or does not, co-exist with another in the samesubject; as, that iron is susceptible of magnctical impressions: Thatit has that or this relation to some other ideas; as, that two tri-angles upon equal bases upon two parallels are equal: That it hasa real existence without the mind; as, that God is. There arc
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