604

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

little arts of popularity, as makes us forfeit the honour we so anx-iously court. Ou tlie other hand, a total indifference about theesteem of mankind, removes a strong guard and spur to virtue,and lays the mind open to the most abandoned prosecutions.Therefore, “ to keep our private passions and desires proportionedto our wants, is the just measure and pitch of this class of affec-tions.” The private passions all agree in general, in their tendencyto the good of the individual. Therefore, when there is a collisionof interest, as may sometimes happen, that aggregate of good orhappiness, which is composed of the particular goods to whichthey respectively tend, must be flic common standard by whichtheir comparative degrees of strength are to he measured. There- jfore, “ to proportion our defensive and private passions in such imeasure to our dangers and wants as best to secure the individual,to obtain the greatest aggregate of private good or happiness, istheir just balance or comparative standard in case of competition.”In like maimer as the public or social affections point at the goodof others, that good must be the measure of their force. When aparticular social affection, as gratitude or friendship, which be-longs to a particular social connection, viz. that of a benefactor orof a friend, is too feeble to make us act the grateful or friendlypart, that affection, being insufficient to answer its end, is defec tiveand unsound. If, on the other hand, a particular passion of thisclass counteract or defeat the interest it is designed to promote, byits violence or disproportion, then is (hat passion excessive and ir-regular. This natural affection, if it degenerates into a passionatefondness,'not .only hinders the parents from judging coolly of theinterest of their offspring, but often leads them into a most par-tial and pernicious indulgence. As every kind affection point.? atthe good of its particular object, it is posable tlu-rc may he some-times a collision of interests or goods. Thus the' regard clue to afriend may interfere with that which we owe to a community. Insuch a competition of interests, it is evident that the greatest is tobe chosen ; and that is the greatest interest which contains Jhegreatest sum or aggregate of public good, greatest in quantity aswell as duration. This then is the common standard by which therespective forces and subordinations of the social affections mustbe adjusted. Therefore we conclude, that “ this class of affec-tions are sound and regular when they prompt us to pursue the in-terest of individuals in an entire consistency with the public good.”However, as there are no independent affections in the fabric ofthe mind, no passion that stands by itself, without some relationto the rest, we cannot pronounce of any one, considered apart, thatit is either too strong or loo weak, its strength and just proportionmust be measured not only bv its subserviency to its own imme-diate end, but, by the respect it bears to the whole system of af-fections. Therefore, we say a passion Is (no strong, not onlv whenit defeats its own end, but when it impairs the force of other pas-sions, which are equally necessary to form a temper of mind suitedto a certain (economy or state ; and too weak, not mcrelv on ac-count of its insufficiency to answer its end, hut because it cannotsustain its part or office in tlie balance of the whole system. If itbe asked, “ How far may the affections towards private good or ihappiness be indulged?” One limit was before fixed for the par-: ‘titular indulgence of each, *iz. their subordination to the commonaggregate of good to the private system, hi these therefore a dueregard is always supposed to he had to health, reputation, fortune,freedom of action, the unimpaired exerci-e of reason, the calmenjoyment of one’s self, vvhieli are all private goods. Another li-mit now results from the balance of affection just mimed, viz.

“ The security and happiness of othersor, to express it more"enerallv. “ a private affection may be safely indulged, when, bvthat indulgence, we do not violate the obligations which result fromour higher relations or public connections.” A just respect, there-fore, being had to these boundaries which nature has fixed in thebreast of every man, what should limit our pursuits of privatehappiness? N'ow, whatever adjusts or maintains the balance ofaffections, whatever in the human constitution is formed for di-recting the passions so as to keep them from defeating their ownend or interfering with each other, must he a principle of a supe-rior nature to them, and ought to direct their measures and governtheir proportions. But it was found that reason is such a princi-ple, which points out the tendency of our passions, weighs theirinfluence upon private and public happiness, and thews the bestmeans of attaining either. It having been likewise found thathere is another directing or controlling principle, which we call

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conscience, or the moral sense, which, by a native kind of anti' 0 'ritv, judges of affections and actions, pronouncing some just aimgood, and others unjust and ill; it follows, that the passions, whir ' 1are mere blind forces, are principles inferior and subordinate tothis judging faculty. Therefore, the passions ought to be sub-jected to the direction and authority of the controlling principle*We conclude, therefore, from this induction, that “ the coiistiU'-lion or just (economy of human nature consists in a regular subof-dimitioii of tin; passions and attentions to the authority of con*science and the direction of reason.” To’ have our defensive pas*slons dulv proportioned to our dangers, is the surest way to avoidor gel clear ot them, and obtain the security we seek after, doproportion our private passions to our wants, is the best means t°supply them ; and, to adapt our public, affections to our social f"lations, ami I lie good of others, is the most effectual method °*fulfillinglhe one, and procuring the oilier.” But thus to regulateour affections is what we mean by a regular subordination of theparsions and affections, which is therefore such an ornament to themind, and such a conduct of its powers and affections as will standthe test of reason. In order to form an idea of moral obligationslet us suppose a parent, a friend, a benefactor, reduced to a con-dition of the utmost indigence and distress, and that it is in out'power to give them immediate relief. To what conduct arc "'Cobliged? what duty does nature dictate and require in such a easelAttend to nature, and nature will tell, with a voice irresistibly a 11 'dible and commanding to the human heart, with an authoritywhich no man can silence without being 'elf-condemned, and whk hno man can elude but at his peril, “ that immediate relief oughtto lie given.” Again, letafriend, a neighbour, or uven a stranger,have lodged a deposit in our hands, and alter seme time redan 11it; no sooner do these ideas of the confidence reposed inns, aidof property not transferred, but deposited, occur, than we imn«“(liately and unavoidably feel and recognize the obligation to re-store it. in both these cases we should condemn and even loathe*ourselves if we acted otherwise, as having done, or omitted doing>what we ought not, as having acted beneath the dignity of oU>'nature ; ami contrary to our most intimate sense of right a " 1wrong : we should accuse ourselves as guilty ol ingratitude, inj(> s 'tice, and inhumanity, am! be conscious of deserving the censuf‘*>and therefore dread the resentment, of all rational beings. But i*complying with the obligation, we fuel joy and self-approbatim 1 'are conscious of an inviolable harmony between our nature anaduty, and think ourselves entitled to the applause of every im-partial spectator of one conduct. To describe therefore whatcannot perhaps define, a state of moral obligation is “ that statein which a creature, endued with such senses, powers, and affi'C"tions. as man, would condemn himself, ami think lie (lese rved b’j’condemnation of all others, .should he refuse to fulfil it; hut void*approve himself, and expect tile approbation of all others, upo"complying with it."’ And we call him a moral agent, who is 'J 1such a slate, or is subject to moral obligation. Therefore, as niai’ sstructure and connections often subject him to such a state of ni°-ral obligation, we conclude that, he is a moral agent. But as n ,, , lmay sometiqius act without knowing what lie does, us in casesfreti/v or disease, or in many natural functions ; or knowing wl' atlie does, he may act without choice or affection, as in cases of ne-cessity or compulsion ; therefore lo denominate an action mod 1 ';i.e. approveable, or blameable, it must be done knowingly #»“willingly, or from affection and choice. “ A morally good ac-tion, then, is to fulfil amoral obligation knowingly and willingly’And a morally had action, or an immoral action,'is, “ to violate*moral obligation knowingly and willinglyAs not an actio*’hut a series of actions,-constitute a character ; as not an alfectio*’hot a series of affections, constitute a temper: and gs we denoni'*nute tilings by the gross, h fortiori, or by the qualities vliH'*chiefly prevail'd! them; therefore we call that a “morally g <>° 1character, in which a scries of morally good actions prevailat"‘that a “ morally good temper, in which a series of morally gi*’*’affections have the ascendant,” A bud character and hail lcu 1 ) 1( -' 1 'are the reverse. But where the above-mentioned order'd!' |>f°jportion of passions is maintained, there a scries of morally pt> 0<affections and actions will prevail. Therefore, " to maintain | l |iltorder and proportion, is to have a morally good temper andracter.” Ilencu it is evident that, a “morally good temper all<character is moral rectitude, integrity, virtue, or the comple 1 ’ 10 * 1of duty.” 1

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