NAVAL TACTICS.

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;.-T<nvs, and almost all their offensive weapons, ineffectual, if notuseless. The squadrons were sometimes ranged in two or threeright lines, parallel to each other; being seldom drawn up in oneline, unless when formed into an half-moon, w hich indeed appears1 ) have been tin: most convenient for rowing vessels, that engagedby advancing with their prows. At the battle of Ecnomus,between tbe Romans and the Carthaginians, the lleet of the for-mer was ranged into a triangle, or a sort of wedge in front, andtoward.; the middle of its depth of two parallel lines. That of thelatter was formed into a rectangle, or two sides of a square, ofwhich one branch extended behind, and as the opening of theother prosecuted the attack, was ready to fall upon the Hank ofsuch of the Roman galleys as should attempt to break their line.Ancient history has preserved many of these orders, of which somehave been followed in later times. In a battle A. D. 1340, tbeEnglish fleet was formed in two lines, the first of which containedt le larger ships, the second consisted of all the smaller vessels,v ed as a reserve to support the former when necessary. In 1343,the French fleet under tbe command of the Mareschal d’Annbaiilt.in an engagement with the English in the Channel, was arrangedin the form of a crescent. The whole of it was divided into threebodies, the centre being coinnosed of 3ft ships, and each of thewings o f 30. lie had al-o many galleys; but these fell not intothe line, being designed to attack tlie enemy occasionally. Thislast disposition was continued down to the reigns of James I. andLewis XIII. In tbe mean time the invention of gunpowder in1330 gradually introduced the use of fire-arms into naval war,without finally superseding the ancient method of engagement.The Spaniards were armed with cannon in a sea-fight against theEnglish and the people of Poitou, on the coast of Rochelle in1372; and this battle is the first wherein mention is made of artil-lery in our navies. Many years elapsed before tbe marine arma-ments were sufficiently provided with fire-arms. So great a revo-lution in the manner of fighting, and which necessarily introduceda total change in the construction of ships, could not be suddenlyeffected. 'I be squadrons of men of war were no longer formed ofrowing vessels, or composed of galleys and ships of the linebutentirely of tbe latter, which engage under sail, and discharge thewhole force of their artillery from their sides. Accordingly theyare deposed in no other form than that of a right line parallel to theenemy; every ship keeping close-hauled upon a wind on the sametack. Indeed the difference between the force and manner offighting of ships and galleys, rendered their service in the sameline incompatible. A change was therefore introduced, both inthe construction and working of the ships, by the use of cannon ;and squadrons of men of war began to appear in the order that isnow generally adopted. The machines which owe their rise to theinvention of gun-powder have now totally supplanted the others; sothat there is scarcely any hut the sword remaining, of all the wea-pons used by the ancients. Our naval battles are therefore almostalways decided by fire-arms, of which there are several kinds,known hv the general name of Artillery . In a ship of war, fire-arms are distinguished into cannon mounted on carriages, swevel-cannon, granadoes, and musquetry. See Cannon, Gun, Mus-ket , &c. Besides these machines, there are several others usedin merchant-ships and privateers, as cohorns, carabines, fire-arrows,organs,- stink-pots, Ac . The writers on naval tactics have beenfew, considering the importance of the subject. The principaland most scientific British treatise on this subject, is “ An Essayon Naval Tactics,” &c. by John Clerk , Esq; of Eldon, nearEdinburgh. Some of the principal French treatises on naval tac-tics arc the following; 1. L’Art des Arm fees Navales, ou TraittS desEvolutions Navales, par Paul lTloste, 1 vol. folio, printed atLyons, 1727. This hook was translated and published by Christo-pher O’Bryen, Esq; in 4to, in 1762. 2. Tactique Navale, ouTraits des Evolutions et des Signaux, par M. le Yiscompte deM6rogues, 4to, Paris , 1763. 3. Le Manoeuvrier, par M. Bourde

de Villehoet. 4. L’ Art de Guerre en Mer, ou Tactique Navale,Ac . par M. le Yiscompte de Grenier. Translations of the two lasthave appeared in English in 4to in 1788, under the name of the“Chevalier de Sauseuil;” and a translation of parts of the threelast is in the 2d vol. of the Elements and Practice of Rigging andSeamanship, published at London in 1794. Other books on evo-lutions and tactics are, “ Thdorie de la Manoeuvre des Vaisseaux,”Paris , 1689. “Pitot’s Theory of Working Ships applied to Prac-

tice,” Ac. translated by Slone, 1743. “ Oe la Manoeuvre de s

Yaisseaux, ou Trait6 de Mechanique et de Dynoinique,’’ Ac . parM. Uouguer. “The British Mars,” Ac. by William Elexney,1763. “ A Sea-Manual,” by Sir Alexr. Schomberg, 1787. “A

Yiew of the Naval Force of Great Britain,” Ac. by an Officer ofRank, 1791, Ac . It cannot be expected that in this work weshould treat extensively on the subject before us, we shall thereforechiefly confine our ob-ervul'on? to the improvements proposed bvMr. Clerk in hi- naval tactics. The system of this author lias metwith great approbation from the ablest officers in the British navy,which appears to he founded on principles self-evident, and istherefore now generally adopted. Kir. Clerk, in the introductionto his Essay, informs us, that upon considering the great superi-ority displayed in the three last wars by The British seamen overtheir enemies, when engaged in single ships, and comparing it withthe very little that, previous to Lord Rodney’sgloriousaction. onthc12th April, 1782, they had achieved when engaged in fleets drawnup in line of battle*, lie was led to conclude, that there must besomething wrong in our mode of making the attack. Jle turnedIds thoughts to the subject, and in 1790 published part of a largei work, comprehending, 1. A Theory of Attack from Windward ;2. A Theory of Attack from Leeward; and, 3. An HistoricalSketch of Naval Tactics.

Observations on thf. present Method of bringingShips to Action.

It has often, if not generally, been the practice, in the case ofsingle ships, as well as in that of ffeets, for the weather ship or fleet,when it is wished to bring the other to action, to steer directlydown upon that ship or fleet, without reflecting that, by doing so,it gives the enemy an opportunity of completely disabling it, be-fore it can attain its wished-for station. For each ship in the lee-line can use all the guns upon one side'; whereas the ships in theweather-line, bearing directly down, have it only in their power touse their bow-chases. This method of attack appears, therefore,to be the worst possible for the weather-fleet, and the most ad-vantageous for the lee-fleet. For suppose a single ship of eighty .guns to windward at B, fig. 1, Plate CXXIV. discovering an ene-my’s ship of equal force to leeward at F, to bear directly downupon her endwise, the receiving ship I’, by lying to, as in fig. 2,would present a broadside of forty heavy guns bearing upon Bduring a course of two miles, in which every shot might take ef-fect; while B, in this position, would have it in her power tobring only the two light guns of her forecastle or bow-chase tohear on F; a disadvantage greatly exceeding twenty to one. Be-sides, the receiving ship F, by laying broadside to, will have allher masts and rigging more open, and consequently will allow shotto pass with less effect than the ship B, which, coming endwise, isliable to be raked by every shot from stem to stern. The conse-quence of which must be, that B would be disabled in her rigging,Ac . long before she could arrive at a proper position for annoyingF, and when she had attained that position, F, by being entire inher rigging, would have it in her power to light in any position, orto make off at pleasure. The method then is, B, having the wind,should run down astern, as per doited line, anti getting into thecourse, or near the wake of E, or a position that will bring herparallel to the course ofF, at a proper distance, she could then runup close along side of F, upon equal terms, as in fig. 3, or other-wise, on shooting ahead, she may veer, anti run down on the wea-ther-bow of F, as in fig. 4, till she shall force F to bear away toleeward, keeping close by F on equal terms; but during thecourse, in both cases, carefully watching that F may not have it inher power to bring her broadside to bear upon B without retalia-tion. It having been often said that the French have made it arule to throw the whole effect of their shot more particularly intothe rigging of their enemy, and that the British , on the other hand,have been as attentive to point the force of their fire against thehull of the ship ; it is proper to state the two cases, and comparethe effect. Let us suppose a ship of eighty guns wishing to avoidthe effects of a close.engagement, but at the same time lying to asat F, fig. 5, intending to receive, with every advantage, an enemyB of equal force, coming down with an intention to fight her ; andlet us suppose that F, by aiming her fire at the rigging of B, shallhave carried away my of the principal stays, eight or ten wind-ward shrouds, or foretopmast, or any other rigging, though of much