NAVAL TACTICS.

5

that this movement must have the consequence of a downrightflight, with the certainty of losing the three ships, From what hasbeen said, it appears, that a fleet B, keeping connected in a bodyto windward, may come up with and entangle the three sternmost

ships of an enemy F, extended in line of battle and going off to

leeward, and at the same time be able to overawe the remainingmain body of their fleet; and that, haying forced the position, thewhole consequences, as already described, must follow' i that is, I 1must submit to the loss of three ships. What has been hithertosaid proceeds upon a supposition, that the fleet F has kept on hiscourse till the fleet B has come up with his rear. Let it then beexamined what other attempts the enemy F can make to avoidoomiim to close engagement upon equal terms. Suppose a fleetof shijis of the enemy standing on the larboard tack to leeward,and going off as before at F, and a fleet of ships in a collected po-sition to windward, as at B, fig. 13, and suppose that the enemy F,perceiving the fleet B pointing an attack against his rear, in placeof keeping on his course upon the same tack, should veer, aud en-deavour to pass on contrary tacks to leeward (for it will not be ad-mitted that he can get to windward); what will then be the ef-fect? Is it not evident, that the headmost ships of F must beforced to leeward by the fleet B obstructing his line of direction,or the line of his course; that they must be forced to begin an at-tack at any distance B may choose? that they may receive suchdamage as’ will stop their way ? that their way being stopped, willof course be an obstruction to the next astern ; or that these subse-quent ships, to prevent this stop, must bear away to leeward oftheir crippled ships, as at G, fig. 18, which will not only preventthese ships from damaging the headmost ships of B, but will givetime and opportunity to B to bring down his windward ships tofall in either ahead or astern, that is, to the right or left of his head-most ships A, and oppose ship for ship of the enemy upon equalterms? But should none of the headmost ships of the squadron Fbe crippled, that is, should F pass B without reach of cannon-shot,which undoubtedly he will do if he can; still, while bearing away,he may be forced to suffer a distant cannonade, ship with ship, onequal terms, whether he veers and gets back upon his former tack,as at G in fig. 19; or continues to run before the wind, as at P infig. 20. But if F persists to pass on a contrary tack to leeward,and without reach of cannon-shot, it is evident, whether he pulright before the wind, or run off ship by ship as he best can, that Emust at some time or other come up with his rear. So far the at-tack lias proceeded witn the wind fixed in one and the same quar-ter. To make the propriety of it the more apparent, it will b<necessary to inquire, What might be the effectproduced by a changiof wind, should that take place during the action ? For this pur-pose, let the opponent fleets be placed in some of the precedinppositions, representing the attack upon the three sternmost ships othe enemy, as in fig. 21, in which the fleet desirous of making theattack is represented in four divisions, as at B, B, B, A, and F, thefleet desirous of avoiding the attack, at the hazard of abandoninghis three sternmost ships at G. In the commencement of the at-tack, let us suppose the wind to be N. and the ships going twepomts free on the larboard tack, or standing E. ; and soon after tincommencement let the wind he supposed to veer round to the W.:men it is evident, by the disposition of the two fleets, that the fleelh, by such a change, will have acquired no advantage whatever;on the contrary, it will thereby be thrown just so much the fartheik | Again, if the wind, by taking an opposite course,

shall shift ahead and come round by the eastern quarter to L, theadimral °f the fleet I 1 ' will not have it in his power to avail himseliot tins circumstance, provided the commander of B, contiiniinacareiidly to watch his motions, and feeling the impulse of the veer!mg wind, shall stretch his ships, as at OO, to the windward of the

iree ships at G, separated from F’s fleet, and at the same time tcre leeward of the main body of that fleet. This will be apparentrom tigs 22 and 23, which exhibit the two fleets, after this ma-rs,^ i,-' 0lUlie la l' board ^ We shall here

hperi - C with some other modes of attack, which have

j- , suggested as improvements of those commonly followed. I« nas been proposed that the attack should be made with the

greater part bearing dow.,- before the wind upon the six sternmostships of the enemy. It is, however, evident, that ships by makingthe attack in this manner must be exposed, without a possibility ofreturn, to as many broad-sides from each of these six ships as canbe got ready during a course of two miles. Hence, as the shipsmaking the attack will assuredly be disabled before they can haveit in their power to hurt the enemy, this mode of attack cannot beproper. If. It lias also been imagined, that some part of theforce chosen to make the attack should be sent to leeward as wellas to windward of the three ships determined to be attacked. Butthe danger supposed, of shot passing over the enemy’s ships> andstriking those of friends, may be an objection to this mode. III.Others have been of opinion, that the headmost ship chosen tomake the attack should come close up alongside of the sternmostof the enemy, and having delivered her fire, push along the lineras far as possible, which maybe supposed to be the sixth ship ofthe enemy ; and as it is evident that this first ship may have re-ceived six broadsides, that is, a broadside from every one of thesix ships of the enemy during her course in passing them, it liasbeen thought possible that the other five ships, by following closeafter her, may attain their stations, eacli abreast of her opposite,without having received a greater number of broadsides than theyhave had it in their power to return ; and therefore that by thismode the number of ships to be attacked will be determined: Foras many ships as the leading ship will be able to reach, as manywill the attacking fleet he able to carry. IV. Again, let it be sup-posed, a? in the former case, that the fleet making the attack hasbeen brought up to action in a collected manner, but subdividedonly so far as the service may require, and that the leeward divi-sions shall be more particularly destined for the immediate attack,while, at the same time, the body of the fleet keeping to windwardshall be supposed attentive to give the necessary support where re-quired ; then let it be supposed, that the headmost snip making theattack, having been soon crippled, shall not have been able to pushfarther than the third or fourth ship of the enemy’s line—is it noteasy to conceive, it is asked, that some one or more of the ships towindward, attentive to support and supply her place, may beardown on the fourth ship of the enemy, under cover of “the smoke,throw in her fire, and push on to the fifth or sixth ship, or perhapsfarther; and that so far as this fresh ship, or a second fresh ship,may be able to push, so many ships of the enemy may be expectedto be carried ? For whatever ships of the enemy can be got abreastof at a proper distance, may be disabled, and therefore command-ed, by the numerous fresh ships kept to windward for this purpose.In all these various methods of attack, the fleel making the attackis supposed to sail faster than the other, or at least to come up withit; and that so soon as the ships are engaged, their velocity willconsequently be diminished. That being premised, a more propermode of attack than any of the preceding will perhaps be as fol-lows: V. The first or headmost of the ships intended to make theattack is to range alongside of the enemy, and preserve that station.The second ship is to make all possible sail to luff up and pass thefirst ship, which is now supposed to be engaged, and get alongsidethe last but one of the enemy, which she is to engage. In likemanner, the third of the attacking ships is to get alongside of theij last but two of the enemy, whom- she is to engage ; and if it beI deemed expedient, the fourth, &c. ship may he engaged. It i$,however, evident that this method can only be practised when tlicj wind is brisk, and that a calm in consequence of a vigorous can-nonade, may render the attack upon more than three or four ofthe enemy’s ships impossible. In all the different attacks up-on the rear, it has by some been thought a great object, if practi-cable, to throw a raking fire into the rear or an enemy’s line ofbattle, by ships detached for that purpose. E'or if shot, as has beensaid, can take effect at a distance of two miles, from thisposition it will surely reach the sixth ship, if the enemy’s line- shallbe formed at two cables’ length asunder; and if formed at onecable’s length asunder, it may reach and may cripple the twelfthship. The reader who wishes for furlher information will be muchinterested in the perusal of Mi. Clerk’s Essav.

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VOL. IV.— so. 1 j 5 ,

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