146

ORATORY.

treats; and are therefore distinguished from external, which heFetches from without, and applies to his purpose. Cicero and Quin-tilian made them 16; of which three comprehend the whole thingthey are brought to prove, namely, definition, enumeration, andnotation: of the remaining 13, some contain a part of it, and therest its various properties and circumstances, with other consider-ations relating to it; and these are, genus, species, antecedents,consequents, adjuncts, conjugates, cause, effect, contraries, op-posites, similitude, dissimilitude, and comparison. Definition ex-plains the nature of the thing defined and shows what it is. Enu-meration takes in all the parts of a thing. And from this we prove,that what agrees to all the parts agrees to the whole. Notation,or etymology, explains the meaning or signification of a word.Genus contains under it two or more species of things, differing innature. Species is that which comprehends under it all the indi-viduals of the same nature. Antecedents are such things, as, beingonce allowed, others necessarily, or vevv probably, follow. Con-sequents are such things as, being allowed, necessarily or veryprobably infer their antecedents. Adjuncts are separable propertiesof things, or circumstances that attend them. These are verynumerous, and afford a great variety of arguments. They do notnecessarily infer their subject; but if fitly chosen, render a thing !credible, and are a good ground for assent. Conjugates are words ;deduced from the same origin with that of our subject. By these |the habit is proved from its acts. A cause is that, by the force of jwhich a thing does exist. There are four kinds of causes, matter,form, efficient, and end, which afford a great variety of arguments.The way of reasoning from them is to infer the effect from thecause. An effect is that which arises from a cause, therefore thecause is proved by it. Contraries are tilings, which, under the samegenus, are at the utmost distance from each other; so that whatwe grant to the one, we deny the other. Opposites are things,which, though repugnant to each other, yet are not directly con-tradictory : as, r I o love and to injure, to hate and to commend.They differ from contraries in this, that they do not absolutely ex- |elude one another. Similitude is 3n agreement of things in quality, jDissimilitude is a disagreement of things in quality. Comparison :is made three ways : for either a thing is compared with a greater,with a less, or with its equal. This, therefore, differs from simili-tude on this account, that the quality was considered in that, but.here the quantity. From this account of common places, as laiddown by the orators of ancient Greece and Rome, it is easy toconceive what a large field of discourse they open to the mindupon every subject. “ One who had no other aim, (says Dr.Blair,) but to talk copiously and plausibly, by consulting them onevery subject, and laying bold of all that they suggested, mightdiscourse without end; and that, too, though he had only themost superficial knowledge of his subject. But such discoursecould be no other than trivial. What is truly solid and persuasivemust be drawn from a thorough knowledge of the subject, and pro-found meditation on it. They who would direct students of oratoryto any other sources of argumentation, only delude them ; and bvattempting to render rhetoric too perfect an art, they render it intruth, a trifling and childish study.”

II. External topics are all taken from authorities, and have onegeneral name, Testimonies. Ail testimonies may be distinguishedinto two sorts, divine and human. A divine testimony, when cer-tainly known to be such, is incontestable, and admits of no debate.Human testimonies, considered as furnishing the orator with argu-ments, may be reduced to three heads; W ritixgs, Vi itnesses,and Contracts. See these articles. The occasion of disputerespecting written testimonies, which may afford the orator an op-portunity of displaying his abilities may arise from live circum-stances; viz. Ambiguity, Disagreement between words and inten-tion, Contrariety, Reasoning, and Interpretation. Ot these itwould be superfluous to give examples.

III. Of the State of a Controversy. The ancients, observingthat the principal question or point of dispute in all controversiesmight be referred to smite particular head, reduce those heads to acertain number, that both the nature of the question might thus he-better known, and the arguments suited to it be di-eovered withgreater ease. And these beads they call states. The number of jthese states, both Cicero and Quintilian reduce to three; and tell jus, that three things may be inquired into in all disputes : Whether |a thing is? what it is? anti how it is ? Arguments suited to demon- ;

strative discourses consist either in praise or dispraise; and, agree-ably to the nature of all contraries, one of them will serve to illus-trate the other. Either persons or things may he the subjects ofpraise.

I. In praising or dispraising persons, rhetoricians prescribe twomethods: 1. To follow the order in which every thing happenedthat is mentioned in the discourse: 2. To reduce what is said un-der certain general heads, without a strict regard to the Order oftime.

II. In praising tilings, all beings inferior to man may be propersubjects for praise or dispraise; whether animate or inanimate;u liether ideal or real; as virtues, vices, countries, cities, &c. Butwhat chiefly claim the attention of the orator, as subjects of praiseor dispraise, are the actions of men. The principal heads of argu-ments, proper for deliberative discourses, are these, taken fromthe nature of the thing under consideration. 1. Pleasure often af-fords a very cogent argument ill discourses of this nature. 2.Profit, or advantage, has no less inflm-uce upon mankind than theformer; and when it respects things truly valuable, it is a very justami laudable motive. 3. Honour, than which no argument willsooner prevail with generous minds, or inspire them with greaterardour. But although a thing considered in itself appear bene-ficial If it could be obtained, yet the expediency of undertaking itmay still be questionable: in which care the following heads,taken from the circumstances which attend it, wiil afford properarguments to engage in it. 1. The possibility of succeeding maysometimes be argued, as one motive to this end. 2. But an argu-ment founded upon probability will be much more likely to pre-vail. 3. But as even probability is not a motive strong enoughwith many persons, to engage in the prosecution of a thing whichis attended with considerable difficulties, it is olten necessary torepresent the facility of doing it, as an additional reason. 4. Ifthe tiling advised can be shown to be in any respect necessary, thiswill render the motive still much stronger for undertaking it. 5.To these heads mav be added the consideration of the event,which in some cases carries great weight with it. As when we ad-vise to the doing of a thing from this motive. '1 hat whether itsucceed or not, it will yet be of service to undertake it. Theseare the principal heads which furnish the orator with proper argu-ments in giving advice. But no small skill and address are re-quired in giving it, as it must be suited to the tempers, sen-timents and circumstances of the hearers. In judicial contro-versies there are two parties; the plaintiff' or prosecutor, andthe defendant, or person charged. The subject is always some-thing past. And the ends' proposed by them Cicero callstquity, or right; the former of which arises from the laws ofthe country, and the latter from reason and the nature of things.All judicial causes are either private or public. Private causes,or civil causes, relate to the right of particular persons. Publiccauses are those which relate to public justice, and the govern-ment of the state; which are also called criminal, because by themcrimes are prosecuted, whether capital, or of a less heinous nature.We need only take the heads of the arguments from this last kind,because they are more copious, and easy to he illustrated; whencesuch as agree to the former, will sufficiently appear. 1. The con-jectural state. When the accused person denies the fact, thereare three things which the prosecutor lias to consider; whether hewould have done it, whether he could, and whether he did it.And hence arise three topics; from the will, the power, and thesigns or circumstances which attended the action. The affectionsof the mind discover the will; as passion, an old grudge, » desireof revenge, a resentment of an injury, and the like. The secondhead is the power of doing a thing: and there are three thingswhich relate to this, the place, the time, and opportunity. Thethird head comprehends the signs ami circumstances which eitherpreceded, accompanied, or followed, the commission of the fact.So threats, or the accused person being seen at or near the placebefore the fact was committed, are circumstances that mav proba-bly precede murder; lighting, crying out, blood-shed, are such asaccompany it; paleness, trembling, inconsistent answers, hesita-tion, or faltering of the speech, something found upon the personaccused which belonged to the deceased, are such as follow it.These are the topics from which the prosecutor takes his argu-ments. The business of the defendant is to invalidate these.Therefore such as are brought from the will, he either endeavours

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