The PREFACE.

To judge rightly in this Cafe, we must suppose two Sorts of Beauties inArchiteBure, namely those that are sounded on solid convincing (Reasons,and those that depend only on Preposejsion and Prejudice ; hy Beauties found*ed on convincing Reasons, 1 understand such as cause (Buildings to pleaseevery one 3 because their Worth and Value are easie to be known, such asare the Richness of the Materials, the Grandeur and Magnificence of theStructure, the Exactness and Neatness of the Performance, and the Sym-metry, which denotes that kind of Proportion, which produces an evident andremarkable Beauty : for there are two Sorts of Proportions, whereof one,which is difficult to be perceiVd, consists in the relative Conformity of theproportional Parts, such as the Dimensions of the Parts in respeB of eachother, or of the whole. The other Proportion, which we call Simmetry,and which consists in that Correspondence the Parts haVe one with another,on account of the Equality, and Parity of their Number, their Magnitude,their Situation, and their Order, is a thing Very obvious, and the EsfeBsthereof such as we can never fail of discovering, as is evident from the In*fide of the Pantheon, where the Compartment of the Vault, having no Re*fpeB to the Windows beneath, causes a Disproportion, and want of Simme-try easie to be observ’d by any one, and which, had it been correBed, wouldhaVe produced a more visible Beauty than what proceeds from the Proportionwhich the Thickness of the Walls bear to the Vacuity of the Inside of theTemple, or from the other Proportions found in this StruBure, as that of thePortico, which has, in breadth, three Fifths of the Diameter of the wholeTemple, from out to out.

Now to these kinds of Beauties, which I call Positive and Convincing, Ioppose those 1 call Arbitrary, beeause they depend upon the Will we haVe togive such a certain Proportion, Form and Figure to Things, which mighthave another without Deformity, and which are not agreeable, for Reasonsof which, every one is a Judge, but only through Custom, and a Connexionwhich the Mind makes of two Things of a different Nature, for by thisConnexion, it comes to pass, that the Esteem, wherewith the Mind is pre-posfess'd, for some Things whose Value it fqiows, instnuates an Esteem, also,for others, whose Worth it knows not, and insensibly engages it to respeBthem alike. This Principle is the natural Foundation of Belief, which isnothing else but an EsseB of that Prepossession, by which the knowledge and