68
INSIDE SUMTER IN ’61.
disabled gun would reply. That the cotton-bales could not be seen fromSumter is not surprising. The sand-bag casemates which covered the gunswere at least eighteen feet thick, and the cotton-bale shutter was no doubtarranged to slide up and down like a portcullis inside the pile of sand-bags.The gunners of Sumter, not knowing of the existence of these shutters,directed their shot either on the embrasures for the purpose of disablingthe enemy’s guns, or so as to graze the sand-bag parapet for the purpose ofreaching the interior of the work. The practice was very good, but the effect,for reasons already stated, was inconsiderable.
At the end of the first four hours, Doubleday’s men were relieved fromthe guns and had an opportunity to look about them. Not a man was visiblenear any of the batteries, but a lai'ge party, apparently of non-combatants,had collected on the beach of Sullivan’s Island, well out of the line of fire,to witness the duel between Sumter and Moultrie. Doubleday’s men werenot in the best of temper. They were irritated at the thought that theyhad been unable to inflict any serious damage on their adversary, andalthough they had suffered no damage in return they were dissatisfied. Thecrowd of unsympathetic spectators was more than they could bear, and twoveteran sergeants determined to stir them up a little. For this purpose theydirected two 42-pounders on the crowd, and, when no officer was near, fired.The first shot struck about fifty yards short, and, bounding over the heads ofthe astonished spectators, went crashing through the Moultrie House. Thesecond followed an almost identical course, doing no damage except to theMoultrie House, and the spectators scampered off in a rather undignifiedmanner. The Moultrie House was flying a yellow flag at the time, and theCharleston newspapers discoursed upon the barbarity of firing upon a hospitalflag, forgetting, perhaps, that we also had a hospital in Sumter, which theytreated to red-hot shot during the bombardment. Of course, none of theofficers of Sumter knew anything about the two 42-pounder shot.
The smoke which enveloped the Confederate batteries during the first day,while not so thick as entirely to obscure them, was sufficiently so to makevisual aiming extremely unreliable; and during the second day, when Sumterwas on fire, nothing could be seen beyond the muzzles of our own guns. Butthe aiming arrangements, due to the foresight and ingenuity of CaptainDoubleday, enabled us to fire with as much accuracy when we could not seethe object as when we could.
Early on the first day several vessels of the fleet were observed off the bar,and orders were given to dip the flag to them. This was done, and the salutewas returned, but while our flag was being hoisted after the third dip, a shellburst near the flag-staff and cut the halliards. This accident put the flagbeyond our control. It ran down until the kinky halliards jammed in thepulley at the mast-head, and the flag remained at about half-staff. This hasbeen interpreted as a signal of distress, but it was only an accident. Therewas no special distress in Sumter, and no signal to that effect was intended.
Major Anderson had given orders that only the casemate batteries shouldbe manned. While this was undoubtedly prompted by a desire to save his