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brigadier-general, and when on the 15th of June Johnston withdrew from Har-per’s Ferry to Winchester, he kept Jackson at the front along the Baltimore and Ohio road to observe General Patterson’s preparations. Nothing of muchimportance occurred for several weeks, beyond a little affair near Martinsburgin which Jackson captured about forty men of a recommitering party sent outby Patterson. His vigilance was ceaseless, and General Johnston felt sure, atWinchester, of ample warning of any aggressive movement of the enemy.
On the 2d of January, 1861, Alfred M. Barbour(mentioned in the foregoing paper), Superinten-dent of the United States Armory at Harper’sFerry , wrote to Captain "William Maynadier of theOrdnance Bureau, Washington, in part as follows:
“ I have reason to apprehend that some assault willhe made upon the United States Armory at Harper’sFerry . My reasons I do not feel at liberty to disclose.They may or they may not be well founded. I deem itmy duty to inform you that there is no regularly organ-ized defense for the post. The armorers have been formedinto volunteer companies, and arms and ammuni-tion furnished them. . . . But the armory might betaken and destroyed; the arms might be abstracted andremoved or destroyed; vast amount of damage might bedone to the Government property before the companiescould be notified or rallied. ... I cannot be held re-sponsible for consequences at present, unless the Gov-ernment itself sees to the protection of its property byplacing reliable regularly drilled forces to sustain me. Ido not look to personal consequences at all. I look to theduty of protecting the property of the Federal Govern-ment now under my charge.”
The next day Major (now General) Henry J.Hunt was assigned to command at Harper’s Ferry ,and Lieutenant Roger Jones was ordered to reportto him with a small force from Carlisle Barracks,Pennsylvania. Major Hunt , in response to his re-quest for instructions, accompanied by a statementof the weakness of his position, was directed by theSecretary of War (Holt) to avoid all needless irri-tation of the public mind. April 2d Major Huntwas ordered to other service, and the commanddevolved upon Lieutenant Jones (now Coloneland Inspector-General, U. S. A. ), who, in a letterto the Editors, gives thefollowing account of thedestruction of the armory :
“ From an early day after I reported with my detachmentof sixty men from Carlisle, it became evident that a de-fense of the valuable Government interests at Harper’sFerry would be impracticable unless large reenforce-ments were sent there; and as there was every reasonfor believing that this would not be done, 1 early becameconvinced that there was but one course to pursueviz., to destroy what could not be defended. The chancesfor the capture or destruction of my small force—re-duced on April 18th to 45 men — were overwhelming, butI counted on the unorganized and undisciplined state ofthe troops to be sent against me, on their surprise andbitter disappointment, as circumstances favoring ourescape.
“ On the Sunday preceding the seizure of the armory,a wealthy miller of the village came to me and offered to
be the bearer of any message I might care to send to theSecretary of War [Mr. Simon Cameron ], saying he knewhim intimately and that he believed Mr. Cameron wouldheed and give due consideration to any representationcoming from him. Having full confidence in the gentle-man, I intrusted him with a message to Mr. Cameron ,to the effect that if he would save for the Governmentthe arms, etc., etc., at the armory, troops must be sentthere at once and by the thousand, 1 further chargedthis gentleman to go to Washington that night, and notdelay until the next morning, as he had intended — all ofwhich he promised to do and none of which he did. Butof his failure and change of purpose I was ignorant uutilhis return to the Ferry Wednesday evening, when Ilearned that fear of the consequences of his mission,voluntarily assumed, had made, him abandon it. Mon-day was passed in anxious expectation; the silence ofTuesday added to my anxiety, which culminated on thefollowing morning, when Ex-Superintendent Barbour,fresh from the convention at Richmond, appeared uponthe scene, told what had been done, and announced thatwithin twenty-four hours the forces of the State of Vir-nia would be iu possession of the armory.
“ As I was acting entirely on my own judgment andresponsibility, it was apparent I must not act prema-turely, before the danger was self-evident and imminent.As the evening advanced, nearer and nearer came thetroops from Halltown, and finally, shortly after 9 o’clock,when they had advanced to within less than a mile ofthe armory,—iix time less than five minutes,—the torchwas applied, and before I could withdraw my men fromthe village, the two arsenal buildings, containing abouttwenty thousand stand of rifles and rifle muskets, wereablaze. But very few of these arms were saved, for theconstantly recurring explosions of powder which hadbeen distributed through the buildings kept the crowdaloof. The lire in the shops was extinguished, hut thearms, which were then of incalculable value, wore de-stroyed. The spirit, devotion, and loyalty of my men, ex-except two deserters, were admirable; four of themwere captured at their posts, but they all eventuallyescaped,— one by swimming the river,— and reported tome at Carlisle. I have heard that within a few minutesafter my command had crossed the Potomac to the Mary-land side of the river, a train was heard starting off forBaltimore , and that it was assumed by the Virginiatroops and their officers that my command had beentaken oft' by that train, and that, consequently, pursuitwas useless.”
Lieutenant Jones’s action was warmly approvedby the President in a congratulatory letter fromSecretary Cameron .
Governor Letcher estimated the value of theproperty secured to the State by the seizure ofthe Gosport Navy Yard and the Harper’s FerryArsenal at $25,000,000 to $30,000,000.
Editors.