MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
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killed. This implied a considerable list of wounded and prisoners also, andthe newspapers gave it the air of a considerable victory. The campaignthus opened with apparent eclat for McClellan, and the “ Philippi races,” asthey were locally called, greatly encouraged the Union men of West Virginia and correspondingly depressed the secessionists.
McClellan, however, was still of the opinion that his most promising line ofoperations would be by the Great Kanawha Valley, and he retained in theircamp of instruction the Ohio regiments which were mustered into the serviceof the United States, sending into Virginia only those known as the Stateforces. Another reason for this was that the older regiments were now nearlyat the end of their three-months’ enlistment, and were trying to reorganizeunder the President’s second call, which required enlistment for “ three yearsor the war.” | Nearly a month elapsed, when, having received reports thatforces of the enemy were gathering at Beverly, McClellan determined to pro-ceed in person to that region with his best-prepared troops, postponing hisKanawha plan till north-western Virginia should be cleared of hostile forces.
Reference to the map will show that as the Potomac route was usually inthe hands of the Northern forces, a Confederate occupation of West Virginia must be made either by the Staunton and Beverly road, or by the Kanawha route, of which the key-point west of the mountains was Gauley Bridge.
General Lee determined to send columns upon both these lines — GeneralHenry A. Wise upon the Kanawha route, and General Robert S. Garnett toBeverly. Upon Porterfield’s retreat to Beverly after the “Philippi races,”Garnett, who had been an officer in the United States army, was ordered toBeverly to assume command and to stimulate the recruiting and organizationof regiments from the secession element of the population. Some Virginia regiments, raised on the eastern slope of the mountains, were sent with him,
expedition against a force of about five hundredConfederates at Romney, which influenced GeneralJ. E. Johnston in his decision to evacuate Harper’sFerry (see note, page 120). In his report of theRomney engagement Colonel Wallace says:
“ I left Cumberland, at 10 o’clock on tlie night of the12 th June with 8 companies, in all about 500 men, andby railway went to New Creek station, 21 miles distant.A little after 4 o’clock I started my men across themountains, 23 miles off, intending to reach the town by6 o’clock in the morning. The road was very fatiguingand rough. . . . With the utmost industry I did notget near Romney until about 8 o’clock. ... I after-ward learned that they had notice of my coming full anhour before my arrival. In approaching the place, itwas necessary for me to cross a bridge over the SouthBranch of the Potomac. A reconnaissance satisfied methat the passage of the bridge would be the chief obstaclein my way, although I could distinctly see the enemydrawn up on the bluff, which is the town site, support-ing a battery of two guns, planted so as to sweep theroad completely. I directed my advance guard to crossthe bridge on the run, leap down an embankment at thefarther entrance, and observe the windows of a largebrick house not farther off than seventy-five yards. Theirappearance was the signal for an assault. A warm fireopened from the house, which the guard returned, withno other loss than the wounding of a sergeant. The firingcontinued several minutes. 1 led a second companyacross the bridge, and by following up a ravine got them
into a i)osition that soon drove the enemy from the houseand into a mountain to its rear. My attention was thenturned to the battery on the hill. ... I pushed fivecompanies in skirmishing order, and at double-quicktime, up a hill to the right, intending to get around theleft flank of the enemy, and cut off their retreat. . . .Between their position and that of my men was a deep,precipitous gorge, the crossing of which occupied aboutten minutes. When the opposite ridge was gained wediscovered the rebels indiscriminately blent, with amass of women and children, flying as for life from thetown. Having no horse, pursuit of the cannoneers wasimpossible. . . . After searching the town for arms,camp equipage, etc., I returned to Cumberland by thesame road, reaching camp at 11 o’clock at night.”
Editors.
| It is necessary to remember that at this timethe Virginia State Government at Richmond wastrying to keep up an appearance of independence,and that Robert E. Lee had been made major-general of Virginia troops, conducting a campaignostensibly under the direction of Governor Letcher,and not of the Confederate authorities. A simul-acrum of neutrality was still preserved, and ashadow of doubt regarding Virginia ’s ultimateattitude had some effect in delaying active opera-tions along the Ohio as well as upon the Potomac.— J. D. C.