MCDOWELL’S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.

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to manoeuvre the enemy out of it. Beauregard ordered no aggressive move-ment until the 21st, and then, as appears from his own statement, throughmiscarriage of orders and lack of apprehension on the part of subordinates,the effort was a complete fiasco , with the comical result of frightening hisown troops, who, late in the afternoon, mistook the return of one of theirbrigades for an attack by McDowell’s left, and the serious result of inter-fering with the pursuit after he had gained the battle of the 21st.

But Beauregard, though not aggressive on the 19th and 20th, was not idlewithin his own lines. The Confederate President had authorized Johnston,Beauregard’s senior, to usehis discretion in moving tothe support of Manassas , andBeauregard, urging Johnstonto do so, sent railway trans-portation for the Shenan-doah forces. But, as hestates, “he at thesame time submit- Sal-ted the alter-native proposi-tion to Johnstonthat, having pass-ed the Blue Ridge,he should assemble hisforces, press forward byway of Aldie, north-westof Manassas , and fall upon

McDowell’s right rear,” while he, Beauregard, “ prepared for the operationat the first sound of the conflict, should strenuously assume the offensivein front.” “The situation and circumstances specially favored the signalsuccess of such an operation,” says Beauregard. An attack by two armiesmoving from opposite points upon an enemy, with the time of attack for onedepending upon the sound of the other’s cannon, is hazardous even with well-disciplined and well-seasoned troops, and is next to fatal with raw levies.Johnston chose the wiser course of moving by rail to Manassas , thus preserv-ing the benefit of “ interior lines,” which, Beauregard says, was the “ solemilitary advantage at the moment that the Confederates possessed.”

The campaign which General Scott required McDowell to make was under-taken with the understanding that Johnston should be prevented from join-ing Beauregard. With no lack of confidence in himself, McDowell wasdominated by the feeling of subordination and deference to General Scottwhich at that time pervaded the whole army, and General Scott, who con-trolled both McDowell and Patterson, assured McDowell that Johnston shouldnot join Beauregard without having “Patterson on his heels.” Yet John-ston’s army, nearly nine thousand strong, joined Beauregard, Bee’s brigadeand Johnston in person arriving on the morning of the 20th, the remainder

SUDLEY SPRINGS HOTEL,ON THE LINE OFMCDOWELL’S FLANKATTACK UPON THECONFEDERATE FORCES.SKETCHED FROM THEMILL, A FEW RODSABOVE THE FORD,