MCDOWELL’S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.
183
During the 19th and 20th the bivouacs of McDowell’s army at Centreville,almost within cannon range of the enemy, were thronged by visitors, officialand unofficial, who came in carriages from Washington, bringing their ownsupplies. They were under no military restraint, and passed to and froamong the troops as they pleased, giving the scene the appearance of amonster military picnic. J) Among others, the venerable Secretary of War,Cameron, called upon McDowell. Whether due to a naturally serious
expression, to a sense of responsibil-ity, to a premonition of the fate of hisbrother who fell upon the field on the21st, or to other cause, his countenanceshowed apprehension of evil; but mengenerally were confident and jovial.
McDowell’s plan of battle promul-gated on the 20th, was to turn theenemy’s left, force him from his de-fensive position, and, “if possible,destroy the railroad leading fromManassas to the Valley of Virginia,where the enemy has a large force.”He did not know when he issuedthis order that Johnston had joinedBeauregard, though he suspected it.son’s brigade of Tyler’s division, an
' y V
SUDLEY SPRINGS FORD, LOOKING TOWARD THE BATTLE-FIELD. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
On the right are the ruins of the Sudley SulphurSpring House. The building on the hill is Sudley Church.It is a mile by the Sudley and Manassas road fromthe ford to where the battle began.— Editors.
Miles’s Fifth Division, with Bichard-a strong force of artillery was to
upon me. I have caused him to be reenforced”;and at 1 o’clock p. M. on that day he added : “ I havesucceeded, in accordance with the wishes of the Gen-eral-in-Chief, in keeping General Johnston’s forceat Winchester.” At the very hour that Pattersonwas writing this dispatch Johnston’s advance wasleaving Winchester. On the 18th Johnston tele-graphed to Richmond that Patterson was at Charles-town, and said : “ Unless he prevents it, we shallmove toward General Beauregard to-day.” Hemoved accordingly, and the Confederate armieswere united for battle. It rested, however, withhigher authority than Patterson to establish be-tween his army and McDowell’s the relations thatthe occasion called for. In considering the require-ments for McDowell’s movement against Manassas ,General Scott gave great weight to the generaland irresistible fear then prevailing in Washing-ton that the capital might be seized by a dash. Itsdirect defense was the first purpose of the three-months militia. The Potomac at Washington wasitself a strong barrier, and with the field-works onits south bank afforded security in that quarter.The danger was thought to be from the Shenan-doah, and that induced the Government to keepPatterson in the valley. Indeed, on the 30th ofJune Colonel C. P. Stone’s command was orderedfrom Point of Rocks to Patterson at Martins-burg, wheTe it arrived on thq 8th of July ; where-as the offensive campaign against Manassas ,ordered soon after, required Patterson to go to
Stone, as he proposed to do June 21st, instead ofStone to Patterson. The campaign of McDowellwas forced upon General Scott by public opinion,but did not relieve the authorities from the fearthat Johnston might rush down and seize Wash-ington. General Scott, under the pressure of theoffensive in one quarter and the defensive inanother, imposed upon Patterson the double task,difficult if not impossible, of preventing Johnstonfrom moving on the capital and from joining Beau-regard. If that task was possible, it could havebeen accomplished only by persistent fighting, andthat General Scott was unwilling to order; thoughin his dispatch of the 18th in reply to Patterson’squestion, “ Shall I attack ?” he said, “I have cer-tainly been expecting you to beat the enemy.”Prior to that, his instructions to Patterson hadenjoined caution. As soon as McDowell advanced,Patterson was upon an exterior line and in a falsemilitary position. Admitting that he might havedone more to detain Johnston, bad strategy wasprobably more to blame for the result than any actionor lack of action on Patterson’s part.— J. B. F.
j) The presence of senators, congressmen, andother civilians upon the field on the 21st gave riseto extravagant and absurd stories, in which allegedforethought and valor among them are contrastedwith a lack of these qualities in the troops. Theplain truth is that the non-combatants and theirvehicles merely increased the confusion anddemoralization of the retreat.— J. B. F.