MCDOWELL’S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN.

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short range was due to the Federal advance, and the several struggles for theplateau were at close quarters and gallant on both sides. The batteries ofRicketts and Griffin, by their fine discipline, wonderful daring, and matchlessskill, were the prime features in the fight. The battle was not lost till theywere lost. When in their advanced and perilous position, and just after theirinfantry supports had been driven over the slopes, a fatal mistake occurred.A regiment of infantry came out of the woods on Griffin’s right, and as he wasin the act of opening upon it with canister, he was deterred by the assuranceof Major Barry, the chief of artillery, that it “was a regiment sent by ColonelHeintzelman to support the battery.” & A moment more and the doubtful regi-ment proved its identity by a deadly volley, and, as Griffin states in his officialreport, “ every cannoneer was cut down and a large number of horses killed,

leaving the battery (which was withoutsupport excepting in name) perfectlyhelpless.” The effect upon Bicketts wasequally fatal. He, desperately wo unded,and Bamsay, his lieutenant, killed, layin the wreck of the battery. Beauregardspeaks of his last advance on the plateauas “leaving in our final possession theBobinson and Henry houses, with mostof Bicketts’s and Griffin’s batteries, themen of which were mostly shot downwhere they bravely stood by their guns.”Having become separated from Mc-Dowell, I fell in with Barnard, his chiefengineer , and while together we ob-served the New York Fire Zouaves, whohad been supporting Griffin’s battery,fleeing to the rear in their gaudy uni-forms, in utter confusion. Thereupon

CAPTAIN JAMES B. RICKETTS, AFTERWARDMAJOR-GENERAL.

& Griffin himself told me so as we rode togetherafter leaving Centreville. He and I were class-mates and warm friends.— J. B. F.

Major Wm. F. Barry gives, in his report, thisexplanation of the disaster to the batteries:

“ Returning to the position occupied by Ricketts’ andGriffin’s Batteries, I received an order from GeneralMcDowell to advance two batteries to an eminence [theHenry Hill] specially designated by him, about eighthundred yards in front of the line previously occupiedby our artillery, and very near the position first occupiedby the enemy’s batteries. I therefore ordered these twobatteries to move forward at once, and, as soon as theywere in motion, went for and procured as supports the11th (Fire Zouaves) and the 14th (Brooklyn) New York regiments. I accompanied the former regiment to guideit to its proper position, and Colonel Heintzelman, 17thU. S. Infantry, performed the same service for the 14th,on the right of the lltli. A squadron of United States cavalry under Captain Colburn, 1st Cavalry , was subse-quently ordered as additional support. We were soonupon the ground designated, and the two batteries atonce opened a very effective fire upon the enemy’s left.The new position had scarcely been occupied when a

troop of the enemy’s cavalry, debouching from a pieceof woods close upon our right flank, charged down uponthe New York 11th. The Zouaves, catching sight of thecavalry a few moments before they were upon them,broke ranks to such a degree that the cavalry dashedthrough without doing them much harm. The Zouavesgave them a scattering fire as they passed, which emptiedfive saddles and killed three horses. A few minutes after-ward a regiment of the enemy’s infantry, covered by ahigh fence, presented itself in line on the left and frontof the two batteries at not more than sixty or seventyyards’ distance, and delivered a volley full upon the bat-teries and their supports. Lieutenant Ramsay, 1st Artil-lery, was killed, and Captain Ricketts, 1st Artillery, waswounded, and a number of men and horses were killedor disabled by this close and well-directed volley. Thellth and 14th regiments instantly broke and fled in con-fusion to the rear, and in spite of the repeated and ear-nest efforts of Colonel Heintzelman with the latter, andmyself with the former, refused to rally and return tothe support of the batteries. The enemy, seeing the gunsthus abandoned by their supports, rushed upon them,and driving off the cannoneers, who, with their officers,stood bravely at their posts until the last moment, cap-tured them, ten in number. These were the only gunstaken by the enemy on the field.”— Editors.