198

THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

In these several ways, therefore, I was almost as well advised of thestrength of the hostile army in my front as its commander, who, I may men-tion, had been a classmate of mine at West Point. Under those circumstancesI had become satisfied that a well-eqnipped, well-constituted Federal army atleast 50,000 strong, of all arms, confronted me at or about Arlington, readyand on the very eve of an offensive operation against me, and to meet whichI could muster barely 18,000 men with 29 field-guns. ^

Previously,—indeed, as early as the middle of June,—it had become appar-ent to my mind that through only one course of action could there be a well-grounded hope of ability on the part of the Confederates to encountersuccessfully the offensive operations for which the Federal authorities werethen vigorously preparing in my immediate front, with so consummate astrategist and military administrator as Lieutenant-General Scott in generalcommand at Washington, aided by his accomplished heads of the large Gen-eral Staff Corps of the United States Army . This course was to make themost enterprising, warlike use of the interior lines which we possessed, for theswift concentration at the critical instant of every available Confederate forceupon the menaced position, at the risk, if need were, of sacrificing all minorplaces to the one clearly of major military value—there to meet our adversaryso offensively as to overwhelm him, under circumstances that must assureimmediate ability to assume the general offensive even upon his territory,and thus conquer an early peace by a few well-delivered blows.

My views of such import had been already earnestly communicated to theproper authorities; but about the middle of July, satisfied that McDowell wason the eve of taking the offensive against me, I dispatched Colonel JamesChesnut, of South Carolina , a volunteer aide-de-camp on my staff who hadserved on an intimate footing with Mr. Davis in the Senate of the UnitedStates , to urge in substance the necessity for the immediate concentration ofthe larger part of the forces of Johnston and Holmes at Manassas , so thatthe moment McDowell should be sufficiently far detached from Washing-ton, I would be enabled to move rapidly round his more convenient flankupon his rear and his communications, and attack him in reverse, or getbetween his forces, then separated, thus cutting off his retreat upon Arling-ton in the event of his defeat, and insuring as an immediate consequencethe crushing of Patterson, the liberation of Maryland , and the capture ofWashington.

This plan was rejected by Mr. Davis and his military advisers (Adjutant-General Cooper and General Lee ), who characterized it as “ brilliant and com-prehensive,” but essentially impracticable. Furthermore, Colonel Chesnutcame back impressed with the views entertained at Richmond, — as he com-municated at once to my adjutant-general,— that should the Federal armysoon move offensively upon my position, my best course would be to retirebehind the Rappahannock and accept battle there instead of at Manassas .In effect, it was regarded as best to sever communications between the two chiefConfederate armies, that of the Potomac and that of the Shenandoah, with the

3^ For the forces actually engaged in the campaign and on the field, see pp. 194-5.— Editors.