200

THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

"Washington within easy rifle-range of the White House, ask for the lady ofthe house, and present it only to her. This delicate mission was as fortunatelyas it was deftly executed. In the early morning, as the newsboys were cry-ing in the empty streets of Washington the intelligence that the order wasgiven for the Federal army to move at once upon my position, that scrap ofpaper reached the hands of the one person in all that city who could extractany meaning from it. With no more delay than was necessary for a hurried

breakfast and the writing in cipher by Mrs. G- - of the words, “ Order

issued for McDowell to march upon Manassas to-night,” my agent was placedin communication with another friend, who carried him in a buggy with arelay of horses as swiftly as possible down the eastern shore of the Potomacto our regular ferry across that river. Without untoward incident themomentous dispatch was quickly delivered into the hands of a cavalrycourier, and by means of relays it was in my hands between 8 and 9 o’clockthat night. Within half an hour my outpost commanders, advised of whatwas impending, were directed, at the first evidence of the near presence ofthe enemy in their front, to fall back in the manner and to positions alreadyprescribed in anticipation of such a contingency in an order confidentiallycommunicated to them four weeks before, and the detachment at Leesburgwas directed to join me by forced marches. Having thus cleared my decksfor action, I next acquainted Mr. Davis with the situation, and ventured oncemore to suggest that the Army of the Shenandoah, with the brigade at Fred-ericksburg or Aquia Creek, should be ordered to reenforce me,— suggestionsthat were at once heeded so far that General Holmes was ordered to carry hiscommand to my aid, and General Johnston was given discretion to do like-wise. After some telegraphic discussion with me, General Johnston wasinduced to exercise this discretion in favor of the swift march of the Armyof the Shenandoah to my relief; and to facilitate that vital movement, Ihastened to accumulate all possible means of railway transport at a desig-nated point on the Manassas Gap railroad at the eastern foot of the BlueRidge, to which Johnston’s troops directed their march. However, at thesame time, I had submitted the alternative proposition to General Johnston,that, having passed the Blue Ridge, he should assemble his forces, pressforward by way of Aldie, north-west of Manassas , and fall upon McDowell’sright rear; while I, prepared for the operation, at the first sound of the con-flict, should strenuously assume the offensive in my front. The situation andcircumstances specially favored the signal success of such an operation. Themarch to the point of attack could have been accomplished as soon as theforces were brought ultimately by rail to Manassas Junction; our enemy,thus attacked so nearly simultaneously on his right flank, his rear, and hisfront, naturally would suppose that I had been able to turn his flank whileattacking him in front, and therefore, that I must have an overwhelmingsuperiority of numbers; and his forces, being new troops, most of themunder fire for the first time, must have soon fallen into a disastrous panic.Moreover, such an operation must have resulted advantageously to the Con-federates, in the event that McDowell should, as might have been antici-