THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

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Turnpike, and at half-past 5 o’clock as deploying a force in front of Evans.As their movement against my left developed the opportunity I desired, Iimmediately sent orders to the brigade commanders, both front and reserves,on my right and center to advance and vigorously attack the Federal leftflank and rear at Centreville, while my left, under Cocke and Evans withtheir supports, would sustain the Federal attack in the quarter of the StoneBridge, which they were directed to do to the last extremity. The center waslikewise to advance and engage the enemy in front, and directions were givento the reserves, when without orders, to move toward the sound of the heaviestfiring. The ground in our front on the other side of Bull Run afforded par-ticular advantage for these tactics. Centreville was the apex of a triangle —its short side running by the Warrenton Turnpike to Stone Bridge, its baseBull Run, its long side a road that ran from Union Mills along the front of myother Bull Run positions and trended off to the rear of Centreville, whereMcDowell had massed his main forces ; branch roads led up to this one fromthe fords between Union Mills and Mitchell’s. My forces to the right of thelatter ford were to advance, pivoting on that position; Bonham was inadvance from Mitchell’s Ford, Longstreet from Blackburn’s, D. R. Jones fromMcLean’s, and Ewell from Union Mills by the Centreville road. Ewell, as hav-ing the longest march, was to begin the movement, and each brigade was tobe followed by its reserve. In anticipation of this method of attack, and toprevent accidents, the subordinate commanders had been carefully instructedin the movement by me, as they were all new to the responsibilities of com-mand. They were to establish close communication with each other beforemaking the attack. About half-past 8 o’clock I set out with General John-ston for a convenient position,— a hill in rear of Mitchell’s Ford,— where wewaited for the opening of the attack on our right, from which I expected adecisive victory by midday, with the result of cutting off the Federal armyfrom retreat upon Washington.

Meanwhile, about half-past 5 o’clock, the peal of a heavy rifled gun washeard in front of the Stone Bridge, its second shot striking through the tentof my signal-afficer, Captain E. P. Alexander ; and at 6 o’clock a full rifledbattery opened against Evans and then against Cocke, to which our artilleryremained dumb, as it had not sufficient range to reply. But later, as theFederal skirmish-line advanced, it was engaged by ours, thrown well forwardon the other side of the Run. A scattering musketry fire followed, andmeanwhile, about 7 o’clock, I ordered Jackson’s brigade, with Imboden’s andfive guns of Walton’s battery, to the left, with orders to support Cocke aswell as Bonham; and the brigades of Bee and Bartow, under the commandof the former, were also sent to the support of the left.

At half-past 8 o’clock Evans, seeing that the Federal attack did not increasein boldness and vigor, and observing a lengthening line of dust above thetrees to the left of the Warrenton Turnpike, became satisfied that the attackin his front was but a feint, and that a column of the enemy was movingaround through the woods to fall on his flank from the direction of SudleyFord. Informing his immediate commander, Cocke, of the enemy’s move-