THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

22 I

rejected in their ultimate scope by Mr. Davis as the commander-in-chief, Idid not feel authorized to urge them further than their execution had beenallowed, unless the subject were broached anew by himself. But there wasno intimation of any such change of purpose, and the army, consistentlywith this inertia, was left unprovided for manoeuvre with transportation forits ammunition; its fortitude, moreover, as a new and volunteer army, whilespending sometimes 24 hours without food, being only less wonderful thanthe commissary administration at Richmond , from which such a state ofaffairs could proceed even two weeks after the battle of Manassas . Althoughcertain political superstitions about not consolidating the North may thenhave weighed against the action I proposed, they would have been lightagainst a true military policy, if such had existed in the head of the Govern-ment. Apart from an active material ally, such as the colonies had afieldand on sea in the War of Independence with Great Britain, a country in fatalwar must depend on the vigor of its warfare; the more inferior the country,the bolder and more enterprising the use of its resources, especially if itsfrontiers are convenient to the enemy. I was convinced that our success layin a short, quick war of decisive blows, before the Federals, with their vastresources, could build up a great military power; to which end a concerteduse of our forces, immediate and sustained, was necessary, so that, weakerthough we were at all separate points, we might nevertheless strike withsuperior strength at some chosen decisive point, and after victory therereach for victory now made easier elsewhere, and thus sum up success.Instead of this, which in war we call concentration, our actual policy wasdiffusion, an inferior Confederate force at each separate point defensivelyconfronting a superior Federal force; our power daily shrinking, that of theenemy increasing; the avowed Federal policy being that of “ attrition,” theirbigger masses grinding our smaller, one by one, to naught. Out of thisstate we never emerged, when the direction of the Government was, as almostalways, necessary, excepting when “ Richmond ” was immediately in danger.

Thus, in the fall of 1861, about three months after the battle of Manassas, —after throwing my whole force forward to Fairfax Court House, with out-posts flaunting our flags on the hills in sight of Washington, in order to chafethe Federals to another battle, but without success,— I proposed that thearmy should be raised to an effective of 60,000 men, by drawing 20,000 for theimmediate enterprise from several points along the seaboard, not even at thattime threatened, and from our advanced position be swiftly thrown acrossthe Potomac at a point which I had had carefully surveyed for that purpose,and moved upon the rear of Washington, thus forcing McClellan to a decisiveengagement before his organization (new enlistments) was completed, andwhile our own army had the advantage of discipline and prestige — seasonedsoldiers, whose term, however, would expire in the early part of the comingsummer. This plan, approved by General Gustavus W. Smith (then imme-diately commanding General Johnston’s own forces) as well as by GeneralJohnston, was submitted to Mr. Davis in a conference at my headquarters,hut rejected because he would not venture to strip those points of the troops