THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

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view the whole theater of war as one subject, of which all points were butintegral parts, or to hazard for the time points relatively unimportant for thepurpose of gathering for an overwhelming and rapid stroke at some decisivepoint; and which, again, with characteristic mis-elation, would push a vic-torious force directly forward into unsupported and disastrous operations,instead of using its victory to spare from it strength sufficient to secure anequally important success in another quarter. The great principles of warare truths, and the same to-day as in the time of Caesar or Napoleon , notwith-standing the ideas of some thoughtless persons—their applications being butintensified by the scientific discoveries affecting transportation and commu-nication of intelligence. These principles are few and simple, howevervarious their deductions and application. Skill in strategy consists in seeingthrough the intricacies of the whole situation, and bringing into proper com-bination forces and influences, though seemingly unrelated, so as to applythese principles, and with boldness of decision and execution appearing withthe utmost force, and, if possible, superior odds, before the enemy at somestrategic, that is, decisive point. And although a sound military planmay not be always so readily conceived, yet any plan that offers decisiveresults, if it agree with the principles of war, is as plain and intelligible asthese principles themselves, and no more to be rejected than they. Therestill remains, of course, the hazard of accident in execution, and the appre-hension of the enemy’s movements upsetting your own; but hazard may alsofavor as well as disfavor, and will not unbefriend the enterprising any morethan the timid. It was this fear of possible consequences that kept our forcesscattered in inferior relative strength at all points of the compass, each hold-ing its bit of ground till by slow local process our territory was taken andour separate forces destroyed, or, if captured, retained by the enemy withoutexchange in their process of attrition. To stop the slow consumption of thispassive mode of warfare I tried my part, and, at certain critical junctures,proposed to the Government active plans of operation looking to such resultsas I have described,— sometimes, it is true, in relation to the employment offorces not under my control, as I was the soldier of a cause and people, not ofa monarch nor even of a government. Two occasions there were when cer-tain of the most noted Federal operations, from their isolated or opportunecharacter, might, with energy and intelligent venture on the Confederateside, have been turned into fatal disaster; among them Grant’s movement infront of Vicksburg , and his change of base from the north to the south of theJames River, where I was in command, in his last campaign against Rich-mond . I urged particularly that our warfare was sure of final defeat unlesswe attempted decisive strokes that might be followed up to the end, and that,even if earlier defeat might chance from the risk involved in the execution ofthe necessary combinations, we ought to take that risk and thereby eitherwin or end an otherwise useless struggle. But, in addition to the radicaldivergence of military ideas,— the passive defensive of an intellect timid ofrisk and not at home in war, and the active defensive reaching for successthrough enterprise and boldness, according to the lessons taught us in thecampaigns of the great masters,— there was a personal feeling that now gave