226

THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

dreaded failure more from my own Government behind me than from theenemy in my front; and, when success came in spite of this, it was acknowl-edged only by some censorious official “ inquiry ” contrasting with the repeatedthanks of the Congress. I was, however, not the only one of the highestmilitary rank with whom Mr. Davis’s relations were habitually unwholesome.It is an extraordinary fact that during the four years of war Mr. Davis didnot call together the five generals [see page 241] with a view to determiningthe best military policy or settling upon a decisive plan of operations involv-ing the whole theater of war, though there was often ample opportunity for it.We needed for President either a military man of a high order, or a politician ofthe first class without military pretensions, such as Howell Cobb . The Southdid not fall crushed by the mere weight of the North; but it was nibbledaway at all sides and ends because its executive head never gathered andwielded its great strength under the ready advantages that greatly reducedor neutralized its adversary’s naked physical superiority. It is but anotherof the many proofs that timid direction may readily go with physical cour-age, and that the passive defensive policy may make a long agony, but cannever win a war.

Postscript.— Since the publication of the foregoing pages in “ The Century ”for November, 1884, General J. E. Johnston, in the course of a paper also con-tributed to “ The Century” [see page 240], took occasion, for the first time, toset up with positiveness and circumstantiality the claim to having exerciseda controlling connection with the tactics of all the phases of the battle of the 21stof July, 1861. Bespecting such a pretension I shall be content for the presentto recall that, while entirely at variance with the part I have ascribed to himin relation to that field, it is logically untenable, at this day, when confrontedwith the records of the period. In my own official report of the battle closelycontemporaneous with the events narrated — a report that was placed hr hishands for perusal before transmission — it is distinctly related that for certainreasons, chiefly military, General Johnston had left in my hands for theimpending conflict the command of the Confederate forces. The precise cir-cumstances of my direct conduct of and responsibility for the battle arestated in such terms that, had I not been in actual direction of the day’soperations on the part of the Confederates, General Johnston must have madethe issue squarely then and there in his own official report. And all the moreincumbent upon him was the making of such an issue, it seems to me, thenor never, in view of the fact that the Confederate Secretary of War on the24th of July, 1861, wrote me in these words:

“My Dear General: Accept my congratulations for the glorious and most brilliant victoryachieved by you. The country will bless and honor you for it. Believe me, dear General,

“ Truly your friend, L. P. Walker.”

Further, General Lee thus addressed me:

“ My Dear General : I cannot express the joy I feel at the brilliant victory of the 21st. Theskill, courage, and endurance displayed by yourself excite my highest admiration. You andyour troops have the gratitude of the whole country, and I olfer to all my heartfelt congratula-tions at their success. . . . Very truly yours, R. E. Lee .”