INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.

23 9

The uninformed, North and South, have wondered why Johnston and Beau-regard did not follow on to Washington. General Johnston, in his “Nar-rative,” has clearly and conclusively answered that question. It was simplyimpossible. We had neither the food nor transportation at Manassas neces-sary to a forward movement. This subject was the cause of sharp irritationbetween our commanding generals at Manassas on the one hand, and Mr.Davis and the officials of the War Department on the other. There was adisposition in the quartermaster’s and commissary departments at Richmondto deny the extent of the destitution of our army immediately after the bat-tle. To ascertain the exact facts of the case, General Johnston organized aboard of officers to investigate and report the condition of the transportationand commissariat of the army at Manassas on the 21st of July, and theirdaily condition for two weeks thereafter. That Board was composed ofLieutenant-Colonel Richard B. Lee (a cousin of General R. E. Lee ), represent-ing the commissary department, Major (afterward Major-General) W. L.Cabell, representing the quartermaster’s department, and myself from theline. My associates on this Board were old United States army officers ofacknowledged ability and large experience. We organized early in August,and made an exhaustive investigation and detailed report. I have a distinctrecollection that we found that on the morning of the battle there was not atManassas one full day’s rations for the combined armies of Johnston andBeauregard, and that on no single day for the succeeding two weeks wasthere as much as a three days’ supply there. We found that there were notwagons and teams enough at any time to have transported three days’ sup-plies for the troops if they had been put in motion away from the railroad.We found that for weeks preceding the 21st of July General Beauregard hadbeen urgent and almost importunate in his demands on the quartermasterand commissary generals at Richmond for adequate supplies. We found thatColonel Northrop, the commissary general, had not only failed to send forwardadequate supplies for such an emergency as arose when General Johnstonbrought his army from the valley, but that he had interfered with and inter-dicted the efforts of officers of the department who were with General Beau-regard to collect supplies from the rich and abundant region lying betweenthe hostile armies. After reporting the facts, we unanimously concurred inthe opinion that they proved the impossibility of a successful and rapidpursuit of the defeated enemy to Washington. This report, elaboratelywritten out and signed, was forwarded to Richmond, and in a few days wasreturned by Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of War , with an indorsementto the effect that the Board had transcended its powers by expressing anopinion as to what the facts did or did not prove, and sharply ordering us tostrike out all that part of the report, and send only the facts ascertained byus. We met and complied with this order, though indignant at the repri-mand, and returned our amended report. This was the last I ever heard ofit. It never saw daylight. Who suppressed it I do not know. A

A See statement from Colonel Northrop, page 261.— Editors.