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RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.

Soon after the firing ceased, General Ewell reported to me, saying that hisbrigade was about midway from its camp near Union Mills. He had riddenforward to see the part of the field on which he might be required to serve, toprepare himself to act intelligently.

The victory was as complete as one gained in an open country by infantryand artillery can be. Our cavalry pursued as far as they could effectively;but when they encountered the main column, after dispersing or capturinglittle parties and stragglers, they could make no impression.

General Beauregard’s first plan of attack was delivered to me by his aide-de-camp, Colonel Chisolm, when I was thirty-four miles from Manassas . Itwas, that I should leave the railroad at Piedmont station, thirty-six milesfrom the enemy at Centreville, and attack him in rear, and when our artilleryannounced that we had begun the fight, General Beauregard would move upfrom Bull Eun and assail the enemy on that side. I rejected the plan, becausesuch a one would enable an officer of ordinary sense and vigor to defeat ourtwo armies one after the other. For McDowell, by his numerical superiority,could have disposed of my forces in less than two hours; that is to say, beforeBeauregard could have come up, when he also could have been defeated andthe campaign ended.

An opinion seems to prevail with some persons who have written about thebattle, that important plans of General Beauregard were executed by him. Itis a mistake; the first intention, announced to General Beauregard by mewhen we met, was to attack the enemy at Centreville as early as possible onthe 21st. This was anticipated by McDowell’s early advance. The second,to attack the Federals in flank near the turnpike with our main force, sug-gested by General Beauregard, was prevented by the enemy’s occupation ofthe high ground in front of our right.

As fought, the battle was made by me; Bee’s and Jackson’s brigades weretransferred to the left by me. I decided that the battle was to be there, anddirected the measures necessary to maintain it; a most important one beingthe assignment of General Beauregard to the immediate command of thisleft, which he held. In like manner the senior officer on the right would havecommanded there, if the Federal left had attacked.

These facts in relation to the battle are my defense against the accusationindorsed by General Beauregard and published by Mr. Davis.

In an account of the battle published in “ The Century” for November, 1884,General Beauregard mentions offensive operations which he “ had designedand ordered against his [adversary’s] left flank and rear at Centreville,” andcensures my friend General E. S. Ewell for their failure. At the time referredto, three of the four Federal divisions were near Bull Eun, above the turn-pike, and the fourth facing our right, so that troops of ours, going to Centre-ville then, if not prevented by the Federal division facing them, would havefound no enemy. And General Ewell was not, as he reports, “ instructed inthe plan of attack ”; for he says in his official report: “. . . I first receivedorders to hold myself in readiness to advance at a moment’s notice. I nextreceived a copy of an order sent to General Jones and furnished me by him,