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RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.

seventeen hundred in number, to Culpeper, would have made it impossible toarrive at Manassas in time. They were therefore provided for in Winches-ter ”; and substituted this: “ Our sick, nearly seventeen hundred in number,were provided for in Winchester.” Being ordered to send the sick to Cul-peper as well as to move to Manassas , it was necessary to account fordisobedience, which my words did, and which his substitute for them didnot.

Mr. Davis (“ It. and F.,” I., 359) expresses indignation that, as he says,“ among the articles abandoned by the enemy . . . were handcuffs, the

fit appendage of a policeman, but not of a soldier.” I saw none, nor did Isee any one who had seen them.

Mr. Davis says (page 359): “ On the night of the 22d, I held a second con-ference with Oenerals Johnston and Beauregard.” I was in no conferencelike that of which account is given on page 360. And one that he had withme on that day proved conclusively that he had no thought of sending ourarmy against Washington; for in it he offered me the command in WestVirginia , promising to increase the forces there adequately from thosearound us. He says (page 361):

“ What discoveries would have been made, and what results would have ensued from theestablishment of our guns upon the south bank of the river to open lire upon the capital, arespeculative questions upon which it would be useless to enter.”

Mr. Davis seems to have forgotten what was as well known then as now—that our army was more disorganized by victory than that of the UnitedStates by defeat; that there were strong fortifications, well manned, to coverthe approaches to Washington and prevent the establishment of our guns onthe south bank of the river. He knew, too, that we had no means of can-nonading the capital, nor a disposition to make barbarous war. He says(“ R. and F.,” I., 362):

“ When the smoke of battle had lifted from the field . . . some . . . censoriously askedwhy the fruits of the victory had not been gathered by the capture of Washington City. Thensome indiscreet friends of the generals commanding in that battle . . . induced the allega-tion that the President had prevented the generals from making an immediate and vigorouspursuit of the routed enemy.”

Mr. Davis has no ground for this assertion; the generals were attackedfirst and most severely. It was not until the newspapers had exhaustedthemselves upon us that some of them turned upon him. On November 3dhe wrote to me that reports were circulated to the effect that he

“ prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battle of Manassas , andhad subsequently restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. ... I call uponyou, as the commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences held by me on the 21stand 22d of July, to say whether I obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory atManassas , or have ever objected to an advance or other active operation which it was feasiblefor the army to undertake.” (“ R. and F.,” I., 363.)

I replied on the 10th, answering the first question in the negative, and addedan explanation which put the responsibility on myself. I replied to the secondquestion, that it had never been feasible for the army to advance farther