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RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.

that conference attracted no public attention, and brought criticism upon noone. I have seen no notice of it in print, except the merely historical one ina publication made by me in 1874,-ft without criticism or comment.

In the same paragraph Mr. Davis expresses surprise at the weakness ofthe army. He has forgotten that in Richmond he was well informed of thestrength of the army by periodical reports, which showed him the prevalenceof epidemics which, in August and part of September, kept almost thirty percent, of our number sick. He must have forgotten, too, his anxiety on thissubject, which induced him to send a very able physician, Dr. Cartwright, tofind some remedy or preventive.

He asserts also that “ the generals ” had made previous suggestions of a“purpose to advance into Maryland .” There had been no such purpose. Onthe contrary, in my letter to the Secretary of War, suggesting the conference,I wrote:

“ Thus far the numbers and condition of this army have at no time justified our assumingthe offensive. . . . The difficulty of obtaining the means of establishing a battery near Evans-port j . . . has given me the impression that you cannot at present put this army in conditionto assume the offensive. If I am mistaken in this, and you can furnish those means, I think itimportant that either his Excellency the President, yourself, or some one representing you,should here, upon the ground, confer with me on this all-important question.”

In a letter dated September 29th, 1861, the Secretary wrote that the Presi-dent would reach my camp in a day or two for conference. He came for thatobject September 30th, and the next evening, by Ms appointment , he was waitedon by Generals Beauregard, Gustavus W. Smith, and myself. In discussingthe question of giving our army strength enough to assume the offensive inMaryland , it was proposed to bring to it from the South troops enough toraise it to the required strength. The President asked what was that strength.General Smith thought 50,000 men, General Beauregard 60,000, and I 60,000,all of us specifying soldiers like those around us. The President replied thatsuch reenforcements could not be furnished; he could give only as manyrecruits as we could arm. This decided the question. Mr. Davis then pro-posed an expedition against Hooker’s division, consisting, we believed, of10,000 men. It was posted on the Maryland shore of the Potomac , oppositeDumfries. [See map, p. 199.] But I objected that we had no means offerrying an equal number of men across the river in a day, even if undis-turbed by ships of war, which controlled the river; so that, even if we shouldsucceed in landing, those vessels of war would inevitably destroy or captureour party returning. This terminated the conference. Mr. Davis says, inregard to the reenforcements asked for (“R. and F.,” I., 449): “I had nopower to make such an addition to that army without a total disregard of thesafety of other threatened positions.” We had no threatened positions; andwe could always discover promptly the fitting out of naval expeditionsagainst us. And he adds (p. 451), with reference to my request for a con-ference in regard to reenforcements:

•fc See “ Johnston’s Narrative” (New York : I). Appleton & Co.), pp. 78, 79.j Evansport is on the Potomac below Alexandria, at the mouth of Quantico Creek.