312

THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON.

was destined to overreach ns and secure to them the possession of ourintrenchments. They had constructed a movable breastwork of hemp bales,rolled them before their lines up the hill, and advanced under this cover.All our efforts could not retard the advance of these bales. Round-shot andbullets were poured against them, but they would only rock a little and thensettle back. Heated shot were firedwith the hope of setting them on fire,but they had been soaked and wouldnot burn. Thus for hours the fightcontinued. J Our cartridges were nownearly used up, many of our bravefellows had fallen, and it was evidentthat the fight must soon cease, whenat 3 o’clock an orderly came, sayingthat the enemy had sent a flag oftruce. With the flag came a notefrom General Price, asking “ why thefiring had ceased.” I returned it, withthe reply written on the back, “ Gen-eral, I hardly know, unless you havesurrendered.” He at once took painsto assure me that this was not thecase. I then discovered that the ma-jor of another regiment, in spite oforders, had raised a white flag.

Our ammunition was about gone.

We were out of rations, and had beenwithout water for days, and many ofthe men felt like giving up the post, which it seemed impossible to holdlonger. They were ordered back to the breastworks, and told to use up alltheir powder, then defend themselves as best they could, but to hold theirplace. Then a council of war was held in the college, and the question of

COLONEL JAMES A. MULLIGAN.

proceed from Macon . City for the purpose. He didso, but his messenger to Mulligan being interceptedby General Price, the latter, on the 19 th, dispatcheda force of 3000 men or more under General Par-sons and Colonel Congreve Jackson across theriver to repel Sturgis’s advance, then within fifteenmiles of Lexington. Sturgis, being informed ofMulligan’s situation, retreated to Fort Leaven-worth. Parsons recrossed the river and took partin the fighting during the afternoon. —Editors.

J There are many claimants for the credit ofhaving first suggested the hemp-bale strategy.General Harris’s official report says :

“ I directed the hales to he wet in the river to protectthem against the casualties of fire of our troops and ofthe enemy, but it was soon found that the wetting somaterially increased the weight as to prevent our men,in their exhausted condition, from rolling it to the crestof the hill. I then adopted the idea of wetting the hempafter it had been transported to its position.”

As to the date of the use of these, which is givenboth by Colonel Mulligan and by Colonel Sneadas the morning of the 20th, we quote the follow-ing circumstantial account from the official reportof Colonel Hughes:

“On the morning of the 19th, we arose from our* bivouac ’ upon the hills to renew the attack. This daywe continued the fighting vigorously all day, holdingpossession of the hospital buildings, and throwing largewings from both sides of the house, built up of bales ofhemp saturated with water, to keep them from takingfire. These portable hemp-bales were extended, like thewings of a partridge net, so as to cover and protectseveral hundred men at a time, and a most terrible andgalling and deadly fire was kept up from them upon theworks of the enemy by my men. I divided my forcesinto reliefs and kept some three hundred of them pouringin a heavy fire incessantly upon the enemy, supplyingthe places of the weary with fresh troops. On the nightof the 19th we enlarged and advanced our defensiveworks very near to the enemy’s iutrenchments, and atdaybreak opened upon their line with most fatal effect.”

Editors.