THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.

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of the battle of the day before, and was now withdrawn, and the greater partof it held in reserve. Pattison’s brigade, of Davis’s division, formed on theright of the Telegraph road, with Klauss’s battery before the center of theline; the second brigade (the 37th and 59th Illinois ), nnder Colonel White,formed on the left of the road, supported by Davidson’s battery. ColonelCarr, although wounded, assisted in placing these troops.

It was a little after 6 o’clock in the morning when I sent out Colonel Oster-haus with Captain Asmussen of my staff to reconnoiter the ground on whichI intended to deploy, and to find the nearest road leading to it. The 44thIllinois followed the two officers for the purpose of marking the right of theposition to be taken, but with orders to keep concealed as much as possible,and not to enter into an engagement unless attacked. Half an hour later, I wasstanding in front of my tent, ready to mount, and anxiously awaiting thereturn of the staff-officers, when suddenly a few cannon-shots in our front,from Davidson’s Union battery, announced the conflict. At this moment Gen-eral Curtis, to whom I had sent word during the night where my two divisionswere assembling, and that they would be ready for action in the morning,rode toward me from the direction where the firing had begun, and, some-what excitedly, said: “ General, I have opened the battle; it will be a hardfight; Davis is already there. Please bring your troops in line as quickly aspossible.” I confess that I did not understand the reason why a cannonadewas commenced on our side when we were not ready to meet a counter-attackof the enemy with a good chance of success, the more so, as I had been outin our front before General Curtis met me, and had found that our line wasweak, stretched out in an open field, the Telegraph road obstructed by artil-lery, ammunition-wagons, and other vehicles, and that there was no room todeploy my divisions, except behind the first line and masked by it; nor onthe left, unless immediately exposed to and raked by the fire of the enemy,whose batteries were supposed to be posted in the margin of the woods, whencethey could reach my troops at point-blank range. I explained this to GeneralCurtis, made him acquainted with the object in view, told him that I expectedColonel Osterhaus and Captain Asmussen back every moment, and finallyasked him to give me ten minutes’ time to wait for them, when I would moveimmediately to the position selected and commence the attack. Even if ourtroops on the right should he compelled to yield, it could only be momenta-rily, as the enemy would have to direct his whole attention to my attack onhis flank and rear. I never felt more relieved than when General Curtis, evi-dently encouraged by this proposition, said: “Well, General, do what you pro-pose.” I must add here that I had not seen General Curtis during the nightand before I met him near my tent; he could, therefore, not have been fullyaware of what I had experienced in my position away from him on the left,and what my intention was to do in the morning, although I had sent CaptainAsmussen to his headquarters to report to him, receiving, however, no ordersfrom him in return. After our conversation, which lasted only a few minutes,the two officers came back in all haste, and reported that they had found anexcellent position; that no enemy was in sight, and that Colonel Knobels-