THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.
332
unexpected appearance; he was badly“surprised” when on the 6th of March,instead of “ gobbling up ” my two di-visions at McKissick’s farm, as heconfidently expected, he only met arear-guard of 600 men, which he couldnot gobble up during nearly 6 hoursof its march of 6 miles; he was alsosurprised to find, on his detour aroundour left flank and rear, that the roadwas at different places so blocked up,that instead of arriving in our rear', 011the road to Springfield, with the divis-ions of Price, at daylight of the 7th,he did not reach that point before 10o’clock in the morning, by which delayPrice’s and McCulloch’s forces becameseparated and could not assist eachother at the decisive moment, whilewe gained time to make our prep-arations for the reception of both.Finally, on the 8th, Van Dorn wasgreatly “ surprised to find himself suddenly confronted by a new, unexpectedforce,” attacked in flank and rear, and compelled to retreat. On the otherhand, Curtis was “surprised” by the sudden turn things had taken, and muchdisappointed because the enemy did not make the attack against our front, aposition not only very strong by nature, presenting a chain of high hills, butalso strengthened by intrenchments and abatis, the access to it being alsoprotected and impeded by a deep creek running along our line of defense.He would have been much more “ surprised ” had it not been for the dis-covery, by our scouting parties, of the enemy’s flanking movement. |
BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALBERT TIKE, C. S. A.,COMMANDER OF THE INDIAN FORCES AT PEA RIDGE.FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
—
II1 ill HiMililij
i.lhi
#111,ft
4 . The reports of Generals Van Dorn and Pricemake it evident that they intended and were pre-pared to renew the battle, or, as Van Dorn says,“to accept the gage,” on the morning of the 8th:the determination to retreat was therefore forcedupon them during the course of the morning by theadvantages we gained. The results obtained in thisthree-days struggle consisted not only in the imme-diate losses, which, as mentioned before, were aboutequal, but also, and much more so, in the conditioninto which the Southern forces were thrown at thebeginning of and after their retreat from the battle-field ; their separation by following diverging lines,the disorganization of their artillery, the dissolutionof the “Indian Brigade,” and of a part of the Ar-kansas troops, and finally by the impossibilty of re-storing order and bringing together all their forcesnorth of the Boston Mountains. A report of the ac-tual strength of McCulloch’s division on March 11th,three days after the battle, shows only 2894 men out
of a total effective of 8384, present at “ Striekler’s,”March 2d, four days before the battle. On the 12thof March Van Dorn wrote or telegraphed from VanBuren to Colonel B. W. Stone, 6th Texas Cavalry,to join “the army ” at its encampment on the FrogBayou road, about seven miles from that town (VanBuren), which shows that the Southern army wasvery considerably scattered for several days afterthe battle, and that Curtis could have followed itas far as the Boston Mountains without meeting anyserious resistance. If Van Dorn had succeeded inhis bold manoeuvre against us, had “cornered” ourarmy and forced it to surrender, he would have comeinto possession of such material of war as wouldhave enabled him to move with thirty thousand mento Springfield and Rolla, and, by at least “ threat-ening” St. Louis , he might have seriously dis-concerted the plans of Halleck. The considerationof such an exigency lends additional importance tothe success of the Union forces at Pea Ridge.— F. S.