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sion. He did not care if some isolated posts were occasionally raided by theenemy. But his regiments were frequently inspected and required to keepconstantly ready for a movement the day and hour of which he proposed tokeep to himself. The notion that Buckner or Zollicoffer contemplated anadvance, which so frequently agitated the military mind before he came, wasdismissed by him as idle. “ I would as soon,” he wrote to McClellan , “ expectto meet the Army of the Potomac marching up the road, as Johnston.”
His policy of quiet had to be laid aside when, early in December, Morganand Helm burned the Bacon Creek bridge in his front. He advanced hislines to Munfordville and threw forward a small force beyond Green River.This resulted in a skirmish between a portion of the 32d Indiana , deployedas skirmishers, and Terry’s Texas Cavalry—notable as one of the few fightsof the war between infantry skirmishers in the open and cavalry.
Nothing else of moment occurred on Buell’s main line until the capture ofForts Henry and Donelson compelled Johnston to retire from Bowling Green and leave the road to Nashville open. |) During November Buell reviewedThomas’s command at Lebanon , and advised with him about an attack onZollicoffer, who to meet a rumored advance had left Cumberland Gap incharge of a strong garrison, had made his appearance on the Cumberland atMill Springs, a few miles south-west of Somerset, had crossed the river, andafter some picket-firing with Schoepf had intrenched himself on the north side.
General Thomas left Lebanon on the 1st of January. As far as Colum-bia there was a good turnpike; beyond, only mud roads. It rained incessantly,and artillery carriages and wagons sank to their axles in the soft soil. On onepart of the route eight days were consumed in advancing forty miles.
^ The letter which follows shows Mr. Lincoln’sideas of what was demanded by the situation;
“Executive Mansion, Washington, January I3tli, 1862.Brigadier-General Buell : My dear sir,—Your dis-patch of yesterday is received, in which you say, ‘ I havereceived your letter and General McClellan ’s, and willat once devote all my efforts to your views and his.’ Inthe midst of my many cares, I have not seen or asked tosee General McClellan ’s letter to you. For my ownviews, I have not offered, and do not now offer them, asorders; and while I am glad to have them respectfullyconsidered, I would blame you to follow them contraryto your own clear judgment, unless I should put themin the form of orders. As to General McClellan ’s views,you understand your duty in regard to them better thanI do. With this preliminary I state my general idea ofthis war to be that we have the greater numbers andthe enemy has the greater facility of concentratingforces iipon points of collision; that we must fail unlesswe can find some way of making our advantage an over-match for his; and that this can only be done by menac-ing him with superior forces at different points at thesame time, so that we can safely attack one or both if hemakes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthenthe other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, butseize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much. Toillustrate: Suppose last summer, when Winchester ranaway to reenforce Manassas , we had forborne to attackManassas , but had seized and held Winchester. I men-tion this to illustrate, and not to criticise. I did not loseconfidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Pat-terson than some others seem to. In application of thegeneral rule I am suggesting, every particular case willhave its modifying circumstances, among which the mostconstantly present and most difficult to meet will be the
want of perfect knowledge of the enemy’s movements.This had its part iu the Bull Run case; but worse inthat case was the expiration of the terms of the three-months men. Applying the principle to your case, myidea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus, and ‘ down-river’ generally, while you menace Bowling Green andEast Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate atBowling Green , do not retire from his front, yet do notfight him there either, but seize Columbus and EastTennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentra-tion at Bowling Green . It is a matter of no smallanxiety to me, and one which I am sure you will notoverlook, that the East Tennessee line is so long andover so bad a road. Yours, very truly, A. Lincoln .[Indorsement]: January 13th, 1862. Having to-day writ-ten General Buell a letter, it occurs to me to send Gen-eral Halleck a copy of it. A. Lincoln .”
On February 5th, the day before the capture ofFort Henry, General Buell wrote thus to GeneralHalleck in a correspondence with regard to co-operation :
“ I think it is quite plain that the center of the ene-my’s line —that part which you are now movingagainst — is the decisive point of his whole front, as itis also the most vulnerable. Tf it is held, or even thebridges on the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers de-stroyed, and your force maintains itself near thosepoints, Bowling Green will speedily fall, and Columbuswill soon follow. The work which you have undertakenis therefore of the very highest importance, withoutreference to the injurious effects of a failure. There is notin the whole field of operations a point at which everyman you can raise can he employed with more effect orwith the prospect of as important results.” EDITORS.