422
THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.
papers, which looked like telegrams. Wholly unexcited, he saluted andreceived the salutations of his subordinates. Proceeding at once to busi-ness, he directed them to retire their commands to the heights out of cannonrange, and throw up works. Reenforcements were en route, he said, and itwas advisable to await their coming. He was then informed of the mishapto the First Division, and that the road to Charlotte was open to the enemy.
In every great man’s career there is a crisis exactly similar to that whichnow overtook General Grant, and it cannot be better described than as acrucial test of his nature. A mediocre person would have accepted the newsas an argument for persistence in his resolution to enter upon a siege. HadGeneral Grant done so, it is very probable his history would have been thenand there concluded. His admirers and detractors are alike invited to studyhim at this precise juncture. It cannot be doubted that he saw with painfuldistinctness the effect of the disaster to his right wing. His face flushedslightly. With a sudden grip he crushed the papers in his hand. But in aninstant these signs of disappointment or hesitation — as the reader pleases—cleared away. In his ordinary quiet voice he said, addressing himself to bothofficers, “Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken.” With thathe turned and galloped off.
Seeing in the road a provisional brigade, under Colonel Morgan L. Smith,consisting of the 11th Indiana and the 8th Missouri Infantry, going, by orderof General C. F. Smith , to the aid of the First Division, I suggested that ifGeneral McClernand would order Colonel Smith to report to me, I wouldattempt to recover the lost ground; and the order having been given, Ireconnoitered the hill, determined upon a place of assault, and arranged myorder of attack. I chose Colonel Smith’s regiments to lead, and for that pur-pose conducted them to the crest of a hill opposite a steep bluff covered bythe enemy. The two regiments had been formerly of my brigade. I knewthey had been admirably drilled in the Zouave tactics, and my confidence inSmith and in George F. McGinnis, colonel of the 11th, was implicit. I wassure they would take their men to the top of the bluff. Colonel Cruft was putin line to support them on the right. Colonel Ross, with his regiments, the17th and 49th, and the 46th, 57th, and 58th Illinois , were put as support onthe left. Thayer’s brigade was held in reserve. These dispositions filled thetime till about 2 o’clock in the afternoon, when heavy cannonading, mixed witha long roll of musketry, broke out over on the left, whither it will be necessaryto transfer the reader.
The veteran in command on the Union left had contented himself withallowing Buckner no rest, keeping up a continual sharp-shooting. Early inthe morning of the 14th he made a demonstration of assault with three of hisregiments, and though he purposely withdrew them, he kept the menacestanding, to the great discomfort of his vis-a-vis. With the patience of anold soldier, he waited the pleasure of the general commanding, knowing thatwhen the time came he would be called upon. During the battle of the gun-boats he rode through his command and grimly joked with them. He whonever permitted the slightest familiarity from a subordinate, could yet indulge