468

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

execute any orders he might receive. He replied that his troops were alreadyunder arms and prepared to move.

Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that Crump’s Landingmight not be the point of attack. On reaching the front, however, about 8a. m., I found that the attack on Shiloh was unmistakable, and that nothingmore than a small guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed atCrump’s. Captain A. S. Baxter, a quartermaster on my staff, was accordinglydirected to go back and order General Wallace to march immediately to Pitts-burg, by the road nearest the river. Captain Baxter made a memorandumof his order. About 1 p. m., not hearing from Wallace , and being much inneed of reenforcements, I sent two more of my staff, Colonel James B.McPherson and Captain W. R. Rowley, to bring him up with his division.They reported finding him marching toward Purdy, Bethel, or some pointwest from the river, and farther from Pittsburg by several miles than whenhe started. The road from his first position was direct, and near the river.Between the two points a bridge had been built across Snake Creek by ourtroops, at which Wallace ’s command had assisted, expressly to enable thetroops at the two places to support each other in case of need. Wallace didnot arrive in time to take part in the first day’s fight. General Wallace hassince claimed that the order delivered to him by Captain Baxter was simplyto join the right of the army, and that the road over which he marchedwould have taken him to the road from Pittsburg to Purdy, where it crossesOwl Creek, on the right of Sherman; but this is not where I had orderedhim nor where I wanted him to go. I never could see, and do not now see,why any order was necessary further than to direct him to come to Pitts-burg Landing, without specifying by what route. His was one of three vet-eran divisions that had been in battle, and its absence was severely felt.Later in the war, General Wallace would never have made the mistake thathe committed on the 6th of April, 1862. I presume his idea was that bytaking the route he did, he would be able to come around on the flank orrear of the enemy, and thus perform an act of heroism that would redound tothe credit of his command, as well as to the benefit of his country.

& Since the publication in “ The Century ” of myarticle on “The Battle of Shiloh” I have receivedfrom Mrs. W. H. L. Wallace , widow of the gallantgeneral who was killed in the first day’s fight atthat battle, a letter from General Lew Wallace tohim, dated the morning of the 5th. At the dateof this letter it was well known that the Confeder-ates had troops out along the Mobile and Ohio rail-road west of Crump’s Landing and PittsburgLanding, and were also collecting near Shiloh.This letter shows that at that time General LewWallace was making preparations for the emer-gency that might happen for the passing of reen-forcements between Shiloh and his position, ex-tending from Crump’s Landing westward; andhe sends the letter over the road running fromAdamsville to the Pittsburg Landing and Purdyroad. These two roads intersect nearly a milewest of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek,

where our right rested. In this letter General LewWallace advises General W. H. L. Wallace that hewill send “to-morrow” (and his letter also says“April 5 th,” which is the same day the letter wasdated and which, therefore, must have been writ-ten on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him athis headquarters, and suggesting the propriety ofGeneral W. H. L. Wallace ’s sending a companyback with them for the purpose of having the cav-alry at the two landings familiarize themselveswith the road, so that they could “ act promptlyin case of emergency as guides to and from thedifferent camps.”

This modifies very materially what I have said,and what has been said by others, of the conductof General Lew Wallace at the battle of Shiloh.It shows that he naturally, with no more experi-ence than he had at the time in the profession ofarms, would take the particular road that he did