5 I2

SHILOH REVIEWED.

a thorough delusion; that Birge’s sharp-shooters were not there, and thatGeneral Sherman was in a different place! Setting aside historical accu-racy, however, the advantage of the revised arrangement is obvious. Itextended General Grant’s territory a half-mile to the south, fully as much tothe west, taking in Tillman’s Hollow, one-third of McClernand ’s capturedcamp, and a large part of the Confederate army, giving a battle front of twomiles and a half instead of one mile, and requiring no greater power of imagi-nation to man it than to devise it. In presenting his map to the Society,Sherman said: “ The map as thus modified tells the story of the battle! ”

There can be no doubt that General Sherman’s position will carry unhesi-tating credence to his naked assertion in the minds of a considerable numberof persons; while the more cautious but still unsearching readers will saythat until the accuracy of the official map is disproved, it must be acceptedas the standard representation of the battle. It is proper, therefore, to citethe proof which rejects both, and establishes a materially different version.The investigation may be confined, for the present, to the location of theFederal line of battle on Sunday evening. The other errors in the maps willbe developed incidentally as the general subject progresses. Moreover, theinquiry will be directed specifically to the Sherman map, as that includesthe faults of the Thom map as well as its own peculiar errors.

It is unnecessary to remark upon the exclusion of Nelson’s leading brigadefrom the west bank of the river on the Sherman map. Its presence there atthe time in question is as notorious as the battle itself. The distance fromthe landing to Dill’s Branch is six hundred yards. Sherman places his“ Detachments,” i. e., the “ reserve artillery,” exactly on the line of thatbranch, whereas they were five hundred yards north of it. During theengagement the Confederates passed the ravine and reached the crest of thehill on the north side. After the engagement Nelson’s division occupied theravine, and his pickets held ground beyond it during the night. None ofGrant’s troops were ever in that position.

In adducing evidence from the official reports to determine the furtherposition of the Union line, the extracts will be somewhat extended when thecontext is pertinent, in order to show at the same time the number and con-dition of the troops occupying it. The reader will be spared the impressionof some irrelevancy if he will keep these additional objects in mind.

Of the position of General Hurlbut’s division, the next on the right of the“Detachments,” that officer says in his official report:

“ On reaching the 24-pounder siege-guns in battery near the river, I again succeeded informing line of battle in rear of the guns. r

That brought his division on the line of the right-hand road leading backfrom the river, but not entirely to the right of the artillery where the Thommap places it. He adds:

“ I passed to the right and found myself in communication with General Sherman, and receivedhis instructions. In a short time the enemy appeared on the crest of the ridge, led by the 18thLouisiana, ” etc. . . . “ General Sherman’s artillery also was rapidly engaged, and after anartillery contest of some duration, the enemy fell back.” . . . “ About dark the firing