SHILOH REVIEWED.

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any rate substantially on the general line above indicated. The same, in acareless reading, might be presumed of the 46th Illinois, which was imme-diately on the left of the 43d. The report of that regiment says: “ The regi-ments both on my right and left fell back , but my line did not waver under thefire of the enemy P But it evidently fell back at last, for the report continues:“After breakfast on Monday morning, still retaining my position on theright of Colonel Marsh’s brigade, I moved with him until I reached and wentbeyond the ground of our last engagement of Sunday , where our pickets weredriven in,” etc. It remains now to determine the question of the extremeright of the general line.

General Sherman says, and his statement on that point is sustained by thereports, that Birge’s sharp-shooters were immediately on his right and con-stituted the extreme right of the line. The official report of that regimentshows that during the afternoon it occupied a “ position near ColonelMcArthur's headquarters ” in an open field. Its camp was in its rear along theopposite or east side of the River road. This would fix General Sherman’sright at the cross-roads near McArthur’s headquarters. It is more than amile from the Snake Creek bridge. Other evidence confirms these positions.The official reports of Lew Wallace ’s division show that he marched alongthe River road from the bridge, and formed in line of battle, facing Tillman’sCreek in front of the camp of Birge’s sharp-shooters and the 81st Ohio , theright of the division being in front of the latter, and the left in front of theformer; and that it came in actual contact with the “ sharp-shooters,” whooccupied their camp that night and received the new-comers with cheers.This is clearly and more circumstantially explained by General Force in hisbook entitled “ From Fort Henry to Corinth,” page 163. He was presentand commanded the right regiment of Lew Wallace ’s division on that occa-sion. The position thus assigned to Wallace must have taken his left wellup to the cross-road at McArthur’s headquarters, and covered the entire fieldtoward the north; for the distance from the cross-road to the right of thecamp of the 81st Ohio was only half a mile.

It is particularly to be observed that in no report, either from Sherman’sdivision or from Lew Wallace ’s, is there any mention of actual contact or ofany definite proximity of these two divisions on the evening of the 6th, orearlier than 10 o’clock on the morning of the 7th. The inference is, thatat the time of Wallace ’s arrival and subsequently, no part of Sherman’sdivision was on the River road, or anywhere along the heights of Tillman’sCreek north of McArthur’s headquarters. General Sherman, in his report,says: “General Wallace arrived from Crump’s Landing shortly after darkand formed his line to my right and rear.” That relative position could onlyexist by assuming that Sherman’s command was on the road leading to thelanding east of McArthur’s headquarters, and nearly at right angles withWallace, —a supposition which is strengthened by the condition indicatedin Sherman’s revised map, that Birge’s sharp-shooters were on his right—not entirely in his front, as they would have been if his front had been onthe River road. It is also sustained by General Buckland’s statement in the