SHILOH REVIEWED.

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from Crump’s Landing, and in the evening, one division of General Buell’s army and GeneralBuell in person arrived. During the night one other division arrived, and still another to-day.This morning, at the break of day, I ordered an attack, which resulted in a fight, which continueduntil late this afternoon, with severe loss on both sides, but a complete repulse of the enemy.I shall follow to-morrow far enough to see that no immediate renewal of an attack is contemplated .”

In his more detailed report of April 9th he says:

“ During the night [Sunday] all was quiet, and feeling that a great moral advantage would begained by becoming the attacking party, an advance was ordered as soon as day dawned. The resultwas a gradual repulse of the enemy at all parts of the line from morning until probably 5o’clock in the afternoon, when it became evident that the enemy was retreating. Before theclose of the action the advance of General T. J. Wood’s division arrived in time to take part inthe action. My force was too much fatigued, from two days' 1 hard fighting and exposure in the openair to a drenching rain during the intervening night, to pursue immediately. Night closed in cloudyand with heavy rain, making the roads impracticable for artillery by the next morning. Gen-eral Sherman, however, followed the enemy, finding that the main part of the army had retreatedin good order.'’’

Several points worthy of note present themselves in these dispatches ofGeneral Grant. There is still, at the close of the second day, the impressionof the enemy’s overwhelming force, which the day before he “estimated atover one hundred thousand men.” He felt on Monday, after the arrival ofreenforcements to the number of 25,000 fresh troops, that “ a great moraladvantage would be gained by becoming the attacking party.” There was,then, a question in his mind, namely, to attack, or to await attack; it wasnecessary to consider all the advantages, moral and physical; he concludedto secure the former at least, and accordingly gave the order, not on Sunday,but on Monday “ at break of day,” to attack. The severity of the contest onMonday is affirmed in both dispatches; it was of such a nature as to preventan immediate pursuit, which at any rate he would only make the next morn-ing after the battle, far enough to see that no immediate renewal of the attackwas contemplated. The pursuit was made on that plan, and found “ that themain part of the army had retreated in good order.” If the fact were notduly authenticated, one would wonder whether these dispatches were actuallywritten by an officer who, twenty-three years afterward, said with boastfulassurance over his own signature, “ Victory was assured when Wallace arrivedwith his division of 5000 effective veterans, even if there had been no othersupport! ”

With this tedious but necessary review of the results of the first day, I takeup the story of the second.

The engagement was brought on, Monday morning, not by General Grant’sorder, but by the advance of Nelson’s division, along the River road in lineof battle, at the first dawn of day, followed by Crittenden’s division in column.The enemy was encountered at 5:20 o’clock, and a little in advance of Hurlbut’scamp Nelson was halted while Crittenden came into line on his right. By thistime the head of McCook’s division came up and was formed on the right ofCrittenden. Before McCook’s rear brigade was up the line moved forward,pushing back the enemy’s light troops, until Nelson and Crittenden reachedthe very position occupied by Hurlbut, Prentiss, and W. H. L. Wallace at 4