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preparing to retreat. The inconsistency of that observation is evident. Ageneral who stops to fight a fresh army is not likely to have had it in con-templatation to flee before one that he had already defeated on the sameground. The published reports show that the withdrawal on Sunday nightdid not proceed from any faltering of the Confederate commander. On thecontrary, he believed the victory to have been substantially won, and thatthe fruit would certainly be gathered the following day. His confidence inthat respect was shared in the fullest manner by his entire army, backedby a particularly able body of high officers. All demanded to be led againstthe last position: not one doubted the result. We can imagine the effortsuch an army would have put forth when animated by such a spirit.

With the usual apologies for defeat on Monday, they rated their strengthat 20,000 men, but, with the fruits of victory in view, it will be safe to saythey would have brought at least 25,000 into action; and it has been claimedthat 25,000, according to the Confederate method of computation, would havebeen equal to about 28,000 according to the Federal method. Their relativestrength would have been materially increased by the large accession of cap-tured cannon. They had also improved their condition by having exchangedtheir inferior arms for better ones which they had captured. Comparatively,the enemy was in a more efficient state than before the battle.

The Union ranks might have been swelled to 15,000—not more. Thatforce on such ground could not have ventured to cover a line of more than amile — its left at the river, and its right near the ravines of Tillman’s Creek.The high ground beyond the creek would have enfiladed it, and the ravineswould have afforded a lodgment and shelter for the enemy. Dill’s ravine onthe left might also have proved an element of weakness, and though thatflank could not be turned, the peculiar advantage of position that aided theUnion troops on the left so much on Sunday, would not have existed on Mon-day— the field of action in front was a uniform wooded surface.

Nowhere in history is the profane idea that, in a fair field fight, Providenceis on the side of the strongest battalions, more uniformly sustained than inour Civil War. It presents no example of the triumph of 15,000 or even20,000 men against 25,000. It affords some such instances where the strongerforce was surprised by rapid and unexpected movements, and still otherswhere it was directed with a want of skill against chosen positions strength-ened by the art of defense; but nowhere else. The weaker force is uniformlydefeated or compelled to retire. In this case the missiles of the assailantwould have found a target in the battle-line of the defense, and in the trans-portation and masses of stragglers crowded together about the landing.The height of the bluff would have rendered the gun-boats powerless; theexample of Belmont could only have been partially repeated, if at all; thebulk of the defeated force must have laid down its arms. There are thosewho argue that General Grant’s personal qualities were a guarantee for histriumph. That is a poor sort of logic, and thousands of patriotic citizens, notunfriendly to General Grant, would draw back in alarm from the contempla-tion of any contingency that would have deprived the Union cause of itssuperior numbers at more than one period of his career.