SHILOH REVIEWED.
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on the road to and not far from the npper ford of Owl Creek, which wouldhave brought him on the right flank of the Federal line, as it was in themorning, and as he presumed it still to be. It would have been at least anhonest if not a reasonable interpretation of the order, that took him to apoint where the responsibility and danger were liable to be greatly increased.The impression of Major Rowley, repeated more strongly by General Grantin his “ Century ” article, that when found he was farther from the battle-fieldthan when he started, the map shows to have been incorrect. The statementof Rawlins, that he did not make a mile and a half an hour, is also not correctof the whole day’s march. He actually marched nearly 15 miles in six hoursand a half. That is not particularly rapid marching, but it does not indicateany loitering. At the same time it must be said that, under the circum-stances, the manner in which the order was given to Wallace is liable tounqualified disapproval, both as it concerned the public interest and thegood name of the officer.
To these qualifying facts it must be added that a presumption of honestendeavor is due to Wallace’s character. He did good service at Donelson,and at Shiloh on the 7th, and on no other occasion have his zeal and couragebeen impugned. The verdict must perhaps remain that his action did notrespond to the emergency as it turned out, but that might fall far short of atechnical criminality, unless under a more austere standard of discipline thanprevailed at that, or indeed at any other period of the war. If he had movedenergetically after McPherson and Rawlins arrived and informed him of theurgency of the occasion, no just censure could be cast upon his conduct.The reports of those officers imply that he did not do so; but McPherson,who was more likely to be correct, is least positive on that point. It wouldprobably be easy in any of the armies to point to similar examples of a lackof ardent effort which led to grave disappointment without being challenged,and to many more that would have been attended with serious consequencesif any emergency had arisen. It was a defect in the discipline which it wasnot possible at that time to remedy completely.
When this article was urged upon me by the recent revival of the discus-sion, I was advised by friends in whose judgment I have great confidence, towrite an impersonal account of the battle. The idea was perfectly in har-mony with my disposition, but a moment’s reflection showed me that it wasimpracticable. It would ignore the characteristics which have made the bat-tle of Shiloh the most famous, and to both sides the most interesting of thewar. The whole theme is full of personality. The battle might be called,almost properly, a personal one. It was ushered in by faults that were per-sonal, and the resistance that prolonged it until succor came was personal.This does not pretend to be a history of it, but only a review of some of theprominent facts which determined its character and foreshadowed its result.Even this fragmentary treatment of the subject would be incomplete withouta revision of the roll of honor. The task is not difficult, for the.evidence isnot meager or doubtful. It says of McClernand , that, crippled at the start by