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instruction, but they were sickand not half armed. Of coursehe might have abandoned theMississippi River to Grant andbrought Polk to his aid, buthe had no thought of that;that would have been all whichthe Federals could have asked.The boldest policy seemed tohim the best, and he resolvedon a daring step. On Septem-ber 17th he threw forward hiswhole force of four thousandmen under Buckner by railinto Kentucky and seized Bowling Green. It was a mere skirmish line to maskhis own weakness. But if he could maintain it, even temporarily, it gave himimmense strategic and political advantages, and, most of all, time to collect orcreate an army. And then (I hold in spite of some dilettante criticism) it gavehim a formidable line, with Cumberland Gap and Columbus as the extremitiesand Bowling Green as the salient.
The result more than answered his expectations. Buckner’s advance pro-duced the wildest consternation in the Federal lines. Even Sherman, writingthirteen years later, speaks of a picket which burned a bridge thirty miles fromLouisville as a “ division.” As late as November 10th, 1861, he said: “ If John-ston chooses, he could march into Louisville any day.” The effect of the move-ment was for a time to paralyze the Federal army and put it on the defensive.
CAMP BURGESS, BOWLING GREEN —THE 70TH INDIANA ON DRESS PARADE. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.On the hill are seen the Confederate fortifications erected by General Buckner.