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Landing. General Johnston’s arrival increased the force at Corinth to about50,000 men, about 40,000 of whom were effectives.
After the surrender at Donelson, the South, but especially the importantState of Tennessee , was in a delirium of rage and terror. As the retreat fromNashville to the Tennessee River went on, the popular fury rose to a stormeverywhere. The people who had refused to listen to his warnings, or answerhis appeals for aid, now denounced General Johnston as an idiot, coward, andtraitor. Demagogues joined in the wild hunt for a victim, and deputationswaited on President Davis to demand his removal. To such a committee ofcongressmen he replied: “If Sidney Johnston is not a general, I have none.”General Johnston was too calm, too just, and too magnanimous to misappre-hend so natural a manifestation. His whole life had been a training for thisoccasion. To encounter suddenly and endure calmly the obloquy of a wholenation is, to any man, a great burden. To do this with a serenity that shallnot only not falter in duty, but restore confidence and organize victory, isconclusive proof of greatness of soul.
But while the storm of execration raged around him, the men who cameinto immediate contact with General Johnston never for a moment doubtedhis ability to perform all that was possible to man in the circumstances.To a friend who urged him to publish an explanation of his course he replied:“I cannot correspond with the people. What the people want is a battleand a victory. That is the best explanation I can make. I require no vin-dication. I trust that to the futime.” ji
General Johnston ’s plan of campaign may be summed up in a phrase. Itwas to concentrate at Corinth and interpose his whole force in front of thegreat bend of the Tennessee , the natural base of the Federal army: this effected,to crush Grant in battle before the arrival of Buell. This meant immediateand decisive action. The army he had brought from Nashville was ready forthe contest, but Generals Beauregard and Bragg represented to him that thetroops collected by them were unable to move without thorough reorganiza-tion. Ten days were consumed in this work of reorganization. Momentswere precious, but there was the hope of reenforcement by Van Dorn’s army,which might arrive before Buell joined Grant, and which did arrive only aday or two later. [See page 277.] But Buell’s movements were closelywatched, and, hearing of his approach on the 2d of April, General Johnston resolved to delay no longer, but to strike at once a decisive blow.
In the reorganization of the army, he assigned General Bragg as chief ofstaff, with command of a corps. To Beauregard he tendered the immediatecommand of the army in the impending battle. Though General Beauregarddeclined the offer, he evidently misinterpreted its spirit and intention. Heimagined it was a confession of inadequacy for the duty, in which case heought to have accepted it. The truth was that, coming into this districtwhich he had assigned to Beauregard, Johnston felt disinclined to deprivehim of any reputation he might acquire from a victory. He had not the
^For part of his much-quoted letter of March 18th to President Davis, written at Decatur, inregard to the loss of Donelson, see foot-note, page 399. — Editors.