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on the mess tables, the baggage unpacked, the knapsacks, stores, colors, andammunition abandoned.”
The essential feature of General Johnston ’s strategy had been to get at hisenemy as quickly as possible, and in as good order. In this he had succeeded.His plan of battle was as simple as his strategy. It had been made known inhis order of battle, and was thoroughly understood by every brigade com-mander. The orders of the 3d of April were, that “ every effort should bemade to turn the left flank of the enemy , so as to cut off his line of retreat tothe Tennessee River and throw him hack on Owl Greek , tohere he will he obligedto surrender .” It is seen that, from the first, these orders were carried out inletter and spirit; and, so long as General Johnston lived, the success of thismovement was complete. The battle was fought precisely as it ivas planned.The first, and almost only, censure of this plan was made by Colonel Jordan,confidential adviser and historian of General Beauregard, who now claimsto have made this plan. The instructions delivered to General Johnston ’ssubordinates on the previous day were found sufficient for their conducton the battle-field. But, to accomplish this, his own personal presence andinspiration and direction were often necessary with these enthusiastic butraw troops. He had personal conference on the field with most of his gen-erals, and led several brigades into battle. The criticism upon this conduct,that he exposed himself unnecessarily, is absurd to those who know howimportant rapid decision and instantaneous action are in the crisis of conflict.
His lines of battle were pushed rapidly to the front, and as gaps widenedin the first lines, they were filled by brigades of the second and third. Oneof Breckinridge’s brigades (Trabue’s) was sent to the left to support Cle-burne and fought under Polk the rest of the day; and the other two were ledto the extreme right, only Chalmers being beyond them. Gladden, who wason Hindman’s right, and had a longer distance to traverse to strike some ofPrentiss’s brigades further to the left, found them better prepared, but,after a sanguinary resistance, drove them from their camps. In this bitterstruggle Gladden fell mortally wounded. Chalmers’s brigade, of Bragg’s line,came in on Gladden’s right, and his Mississippians drove the enemy, underStuart, with the bayonet half a mile. He was about to charge again, whenGeneral Johnston came up, and moved him to the right, and brought JohnK. Jackson’s brigade into the interval. Prentiss’s left and Stuart’s brigaderetreated sullenly, not routed, but badly hammered.
With Hindman as a pivot, the turning movement began from the momentof the overthrow of Prentiss’s camps. While the front attacks were made allalong the line with a desperate courage which would have swept any ordinaryresistance from the field, and with a loss which told fearfully on the assail-ants, they were seconded by assaults in flank which invariably resulted incrushing the Federal line with destructive force and strewing the field withthe wounded and the dead. The Federal reports complain that they wereflanked and outnumbered, which is true; for, though fewer, the Confederateswere probably stronger at every given point throughout the day except atthe center called the Hornets’ Nest, where the Federals eventually massed