57»

THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.

his attack, however, until the 12th,—until siege-guns could be broughtup,—the works there were easily made so untenable that General McCownabandoned them and transferred his forces, at night, across the river to sup-port the heavy batteries at Madrid Bend and Island Number Ten.

About the time Pittsburg Landing was made General Grant’s base, I hadcollected within easy marches of Corinth about 23,000 men of all arms of theservice, independent of the forces of General Polk,—giving, with his troopsand including those at Forts Pillow and Madrid Bend, an aggregate of atmost 44,000 men, of excellent personality but badly armed—particularly thecavalry, some of whom had no arms at all. The new forces, with the excep-tion of those from Mobile, Pensacola, and New Orleans , were raw and undis-ciplined. Made aware by the great number of transports | that were nowplying up and down the Tennessee of the magnitude of the invasion thatclearly threatened the seizure of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, the delayon the part of the Bowling Green forces filled both General Bragg and myselfwith great solicitude. Meanwhile, on the 15th of March, General Johnstonaddressed me by telegraph: “ Have you had the south bank of the Hatcheeexamined near Bolivar ? I recommend it to your attention. It has, besidesthe other advantages, that of being further from the enemy’s line,”—thatis, Pittsburg Landing. As the essential point for us, however, was tostrike a blow at General Grant so soon as General Johnston’s troops wereunited with mine, but before Buell’s junction with the exposed army atPittsburg, I could see no possible advantage in the least increase of dis-tance from our real objective so soon as the advent of General Johnston’stroops should give us the power to undertake the offensive. Exposing thesefeatures of the situation, I again urged General Johnston to hurry his forcesforward.

On the 22d of March he reached Corinth with his staff, and I went downfrom Jackson to meet him. Proceeding at once to explain to him whatresources had been collected and all that was known of the position andnumbers of our adversary at Pittsburg, as also my views of the imperativenecessity for an immediate movement against that adversary lest Buell’sforces should become a fatal factor in the campaign, to my surprise GeneralJohnston, with much emotion, informed me that it was his purpose to turnover to me the command of the entire force being assembled at Corinth, andthereafter confine himself to the duties of department commander, with hisheadquarters either at Memphis or Holly Springs, in Mississippi . This course,as he explained, he felt called upon to take in order to restore confidence tothe people and even the army, so greatly impaired by reason of recent disas-ters. Thoroughly understanding and appreciating his motives (and aboutthese and his words there could be no possible misinterpretation), I declined asaltogether unnecessary the unselfish tender of the command, but agreed, aftersome further exchange of views touching the military situation, to draw upa plan for the organization of our forces, and, as second in command, tosupervise the task of organization.

J. Sixty-one of these transports were reported to have passed by a point known as Coffee.— G. T. B.