582
THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.
and next to Hardee’s troops those under Polk had been most seasonedby marching.
Although our troops were under arms at an early hour on the 3d of April,as prescribed in the “circular” order, it is a part of the history of the cam-paign that the commanders of the two leading corps not only failed to puttheir troops in motion at least as early as meridian on the 3d of April, butdid not move until so late in the afternoon as in effect to cause our army toreach the presence of its objective twenty-four hours later than there wasevery reason to expect, considering the shortness of the distance to be over-come. What led to this delay of the outset of the Second and Third corpshas certainly never been explained in any official document which has yetseen the light. Their preparations necessary for such a movement were ofthe slightest, or only to cook five days’ rations, and to load a few wagons, forthe amount of ammunition to be carried was no more than they had beendirected some days previously to have and keep in possession of the troops.Moreover, Hardee’s corps (Polk’s also), “with all detached brigades,” had beenunder orders of “readiness for a field movement” ever since the 1st of April(“Official Records,” Vol. X., Part II., p. 381). Be this as it may, Bragg’s corpsdid not quit the vicinage of Corinth until so late that afternoon that none of itreached Monterey , twelve miles away, until the next morning at 8:30, andone division (Withers’s) was not there until late on the 4th of April. Har-dee’s corps, though dilatory in quitting Corinth, would have easily reached itsdestination early enough on the second day’s march to have been deployed onthe same ground that it occupied on the night of the 5th, twenty-four hourslater, had not General Bragg interposed his authority to check its advance.The march on the 4th was unaccountably slow and confused, especially that ofthe Second Corps, in view of the numerous staff attached to the headquartersof each corps. The roads were extremely narrow and rendered excessivelybad for artillery in some places by the rains, while the Second Corps wasunused to marching; but all this hardly made it out of the power of that armyto reach its objective by the night of April 4th, had there been a closerpersonal attention given to the movement during that day by those whoseduty it was to execute Special Orders, No. 8. And the cost was an irreme-diable loss of twenty-four hours. Another misadventure, that might havebrought us sore disaster, was a cavalry reconnoissance with two pieces of artil-lery pushed forward without authority on the 4th, from Bragg’s corps into
and Colonel Johnston, is in these words: “ Cor-inth, April 3d, 1862. General Buell in motion30,000 strong, rapidly from Columbia by Cliftonto Savannah. Mitehel behind him with 10,000.Confederate forces — 40,000—ordered forwardto offer battle near Pittsburg. Division fromBethel, main body from Corinth, reserve fromBurnsville, converging to-morrow near Monterey on Pittsburg. Beauregard second in command,Polk the left, Bragg the center, Hardee the rightwing, Breckinridge the reserve. Hope engage-ment before Buell can form junction.
“To the President, Richmond.”
In publishing it as found among his father’spapers, the sonpresenfts this telegram as “contain-ing the plan of battle as General Johnston hadoriginally devised, but not as he had fought it;doubtless in deference to General Beauregard’sopinion in the matter, and for reasons whichseemed sufficient at the time.” On the other hand,Mr. Davis gives it not as a plan of battle, but merelyof the inarch from Corinth to the field,— while thealleged missing dispatch of the 4th of April gavenot only the plan of battle as devised, but as itwas fought up to the moment of General John-ston’s death.— G. T. B.