586

THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.

fortified.’’^ Further, even when leaving Savannah the next morning, GeneralGrant scarcely at first can have believed that his army was being seriouslyattacked, for instead of dispatching to the field the whole of Nelson’s divisionby steamers, he ordered it to march thither by a wretched road, a marchthat occupied nearly the whole day. Aside, however, from such documen-tary evidence, or did none exist, the absence of all those ordinary precautionsthat habitually shield an army in the field must forbid the historian fromregarding it as other than one of the most surprising surprises ever achieved.

About 5 a. m. the Confederate lines were set in motion. The first collisionwas in the quarter of Gladden’s brigade, on our right, and with a battalionof five companies of the 21st Missouri of Prentiss’s division dispatched wellto the front by General Prentiss, of his own motion, as early as 3 a. m. Butfor this incident, due solely to the intelligent, soldierly forethought of anofficer not trained to the business of war, the whole Federal front wouldhave been struck wholly unawares, for nowhere else had such prudencebeen shown.

Exactly at 6 a. m. Prentiss’s whole division was under fire, and the battleof Shiloh began in earnest.

As soon as the outburst of musketry and artillery gave notice that Hardee’sline was engaged, General Johnston said that he should go to the front,leaving me in the general direction, as the exigencies of the battle mightarise. J Then he rode forward with his personal staff and the chief engineerof the army, Colonel Gilmer, the only officer of the general staff in his suite,Colonel Jordan, remaining with me. At 7:30 a. m., by which time the battlewas in full tide, as was evident from the play of artillery and the heavy, con-tinuous rattle of small arms, I ordered Generals Polk and Breckinridge tohasten forward, the first to the support of our now engaged left, and the latterin a like service affecting our right. Adjutant-General Jordan, whom I hadearly in the morning directed to impress personally on the corps commandersthe value of fighting their artillery massed twelve guns at a point, was alsonow dispatched forward to overlook the field and urge on the attack con-tinuously at as many points as possible.

When our attack reached Sherman’s division, owing to the failure ofHardee to keep his left near Owl Creek as was intended, only the left bri-gade of that division on the Federal right was struck, leaving intact the othertwo to the left of our left flank, which were swiftly formed by GeneralSherman on strong ground with a small watercourse in his front. But theother stricken brigade was swept out of its encampment, scattered, and tookno further part as an organization in the battle of either day.

While Hardee’s left failed to touch the enemy’s right, on his own rightthere was left a vacant space between it and Lick Creek, to fill which Chal-mers’s brigade of Withers’s division, Bragg’s corps, was ordered up from thesecond line, with a battery; and a hot, urgent conflict ensued in that quarter,in which General Johnston was present, after Chalmers had carried at least

•fc Diary of Col. Jacob Ammen, “Official Records,” Vol. X., Part I., p. 331.

i See report of Col. Thompson, A. D. C., p. 570, “ Life of General A. S. Johnston,” by W. P. Johnston.