NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER AT SHILOH.

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in charge by myself, and, assisted by Major Gilmer, chief engineer on thestaff, I interrogated him with the least possible semblance of so doing, withthe result of satisfying me, as I reported to Generals Johnston and Beaure-gard, that we should have no earth-works to encounter, and an enemy whollyunaware of what was so near at hand.

IV.

It has more than once been represented with pencil, as well as with pen,that there was a somewhat dramatic conference of the Confederate generalsaround the camp-fire the night before the battle of the 6th of April. Thesimple fact is this: Hardee, whose corps was to be in the advance in theattack, having reached a point known to be somewhat less than two milesfrom our adversary, was halted and deployed in line of battle across thePittsburg road to await the arrival and formation in his rear of the rest ofthe army as prescribed in the battle order. As this was not effected untilafter 3 o’clock, it was too late to make the attack that day. As a matter ofcourse in such a contingency, the corps commanders were called to meet Gen-erals Johnston and Beauregard, who, having gone from Monterey togetherwith the general staff and their respective personal staffs, had taken a position,dismounted, on the Pittsburg road, somewhat to the rear of Hardee’s corps.The meeting took place about 4 o’clock. General Polk now reported thathis men were almost destitute of provisions, having either already consumedor thrown them away. General Bragg reported that his own men had beenmore provident, and therefore could spare enough for the emergency. Deeplydissatisfied with the inexplicable manner in which both Bragg’s and Polk’scorps had been delayed, both before reaching and after leaving Monterey , aswell as by the injudicious manner in which a reconnoissance had been madewith such aggressiveness and use of artillery as ought to have apprised anysharp-sighted enemy that an offensive army was not far distant, GeneralBeauregard — though it had been upon his urgent instance that the advancehad been made — did not hesitate to say that, inasmuch as it was scarcelypossible for the enemy to be unaware of our presence and purpose, should weattack next morning we would find the Pederals ready for us intrenchedto the eyes; whereas the whole success of the movement had depended onour ability to assail our enemy unexpectedly. Therefore he advised thereturn of the Confederate army to Corinth, as it assuredly was not in acondition to attack an army superior in numbers and behind the intrench-ments that would now be thrown up in expectation of our approach.

General Johnston listened attentively to what General Beauregard said,and at length replied in substance that he recognized its weight; neverthe-less, as he hoped the enemy was not suspecting our proximity, he felt bound,as he had put the army in motion for a battle, to venture the hazard. Where-upon the officers rapidly dispersed to their respective commands for thatventure. As I have seen it intimated, among others by General Bragg, thatthis conference was a mere casual or “ partly accidental meeting of general