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THE SHILOH BATTLE-ORDER AND THE WITHDRAWAL.

extreme right that he was hard pressed, and neededreinforcements. My regiment, which was at thetime just behind General Beauregard, held in re-serve by his orders, was sent by him to GeneralBreckinridge’s assistance. We marched down theline of battle to the extreme right, passed beyondGeneral Breckinridge’s right, wheeled by com-panies into line of battle, and went in with the“ rebel yell.” The men on our left took up the yelland the charge, and we gained several hundredyards of ground. From this point we fought back

slowly and steadily for several hours, until wordcame that the army was ordered to retreat, thatthe commands would fall back in succession fromthe left, and that the right wing would be the rear-guard. This order was carried out, and when nightcame the right wing was slow’ly falling back withface to the foe. We halted on the same ground wehad occupied on the morning of the 6th, justbefore the battle began. If there was any “break-ing” and “starting,” as General Grant expressesit, I did not witness it.

THE SHILOH BATTLE-ORDER AND THE WITHDRAWAL SUNDAY EVENING.

BY ALEXANDER ROBERT CHISOLM, COLONEL, C. S. A. (AT SHILOH ON GENERAL BEAUREGARD’S STAFF).

In the paper published in “The Century ” for Feb-ruary, 1885, Colonel William Preston Johnston ,assuming to give the Confederate version of thecampaign and battle of Shiloh, at which he wasnot present, has adventured material statementsregarding operations on that field, which must havebeen based on misinformation or misunderstand-ing in essential particulars, as I take occasion toassert from personal knowledge acquired as an eye-witness and aide-de-camp on the staff of GeneralBeauregard. My personal knowledge runs counterto many of his statements and deductions, but Ishall here confine myself to two points.

First, I must dispute that the battle-order aspromulgated was in any wise different from theone submitted by General Beauregard at his ownquarters at Corinth, early in the morning of the 3dof April, to General A. S. Johnston , and which wasaccepted without modification or suggestion. Thisassertion I base on these facts : About 1 o’clockin the morning the adjutant-general of the Confed-erate forces, Colonel Jordan, aroused me fromsleep in my tent, close by General Beauregard’schamber, and desired me to inform the general atdawn that General Johnston had agreed to hisrecommendation to move offensively against Pitts-burg Landing early that same day, and that thecircular orders to the corps commanders had beenalready issued by Colonel Jordan to that effect.Acting upon this request, I found that GeneralBeauregard had already during the night made fullnotes on loose scraps of paper of the order of marchand battle, from which he read aloud for me tocopy — my copy being given to Colonel Jordan assoon as completed, as the basis of the official orderwhich he was to frame, and did frame and issue inthe name of General Johnston . And that is theorder which Colonel Johnston erroneously allegesupon the posthumous authority of General Braggto differ essentially from the plan settled upon byGeneral Johnston for the battle. This allegation Iknow to be unfounded, as the order as issued variesin no wise from the notes dictated to me by GeneralBeauregard, excepting the mere wording and somedetails relating to transportation and ordnanceservice added by Colonel Jordan; that is to say, theplan explained by General Beauregard and acceptedby General Johnston at the quarters of the former.

Being limited as to space, I shall pass over athrong of facts within my personal knowledge,

which would establish that General Beauregardwas as actively and directly handling the Con-federate forces engaged in their general conductof the battle before the death of General Johnston as he was after that incident. I shall confine my-self on this occasion to relating that after GeneralBeauregard became cognizant of the death of Gen-eral Johnston , he dispatched me to the front withorders that led to the concentration of the widelyscattered and disarrayed Confederate forces, whichresulted in the capture of General Prentiss and somany of his division after 5 o’clock on the 6th.

I also, later in the day, carried orders to Hardee,who was engaged on our extreme left, or Federalright, where I remained with that officer until almostdark, up to which time no orders had reached himto cease fighting. On the contrary, he was doinghis best to force back the enemy in his front. Ashe was without any of his staff about him, for thenonce I acted as his aide-de-camp. Meantime thegun-boats were shelling furiously, and their hugemissiles crushed through the branches of the treesoverhead with so fearful a din, frequency, and close-ness that, despite the excitement of our apparentlycomplete victory, there was room left in our mindsfor some most unpleasant sensations, especiallywhen the top of some lofty tree, cut off by a shell,would come toppling down among the men.

Possibly, had Colonel Johnston been present onthe field at that last hour of the battle of the 6th,a witness of the actually fruitless efforts made tostorm the last position held by the enemy uponthe ridge covering the immediate landing-place,known as Pittsburg, he might be better informedwhy it was that that position was not carried, andbe less disposed to adduce such testimony as thatof General Bragg, to the effect that but for theorder given by Beauregard to withdraw from actionhe would have carried all before him.

It so happened that I rejoined General Beaure-gard at a point near Shiloh Chapel (having escortedGeneral Prentiss from the field to General Beaure-gard), when General Bragg rode up from the front,and I heard him say in an excited manner: “Gen-eral, we have carried everything before us to theTennessee River. I have ridden from Owl to LickCreek, and there is none of the enemy to be seen.”Beauregard quietly replied: “Then, General, donot unnecessarily expose your command to the fireof the gun-boats.”