port, made five days after the tattle, which he in-forms us should read as bracketed:
“ Selecting a road that led directly to the right ofthe lines, as they were established around PittsburgLanding on Sunday morning, my column started im-mediately, the distance being about six miles. Thecannonading, distinctly audible, quickened the steps ofthe men. Snake Creek [Owl Creek], difficult of passageat all times on account of its steep banks and swampybottoms, ran between me and the point of junction.Short way from it [Owl Creek] Captain Rowley, from
General Grant, . . . overtook me.It seemed, on
his representation, most prudent to carry the columnacross to what is called the‘River Road.’ . . . This
movement occasioned a counter-march, which delayedmy junction with the main army until a little afternightfall.”
CHARACTER OF THE MARCH.
Rowley, McPherson, and Rawlins report thatthey represented the need of haste, and that themarch was slow:
“ Of the character of the march, after I overtook Gen-eral Wallace , I can only say that to me it appeared in-tolerably slow, resembling more a reconnoissance in theface of an enemy than a forced inarch to relieve a hard-pressed army. So strongly did this impression take holdof my mind, that I took the liberty of repeating to Gen-eral Wallace that part of General Grant’s order enjoin-ing haste.” [Rowley.]
“After I had reached the head of the column, I mustsay it seemed to me that the march was not as rapid asthe urgency of the case required. Perhaps this arose ina great measure from my impatience and anxiety to getthis force on the field before dark. ...” [McPherson]
“ Colonel McPherson and I came up to him about 3:30o’clock p. M. He was then not to exceed four or fourand a half miles [two and a half miles ?] from the sceneof action; the roads were in fine condition; he wasmarching light; his men were in buoyant spirits, withinhearing of the musketry, and eager to get forward. Hedid not make a mile and a half an hour, although urgedand appealed to, to push forward. Had he moved withthe rapidity his command were able and anxious to havemoved after we overtook him, he would have reachedyou [Grant] in time to have engaged the enemy beforethe close of Sunday’s fight.” [Rawlins.]
General Wallace denies this last conclusion andthe statement about the condition of the road.General KnefLer says [letter to Wallace ] : u Aftersome hard marching over execrable roads, wereached our position about dusk.” Col. JamesR. Ross says [letter to Wallace , January 25th,1868] : a We had to march over the worst roadI ever remember to have seen. In many placesit was almost impossible to get artillery through.”
The head of the column did not arrive at K untilafter dark, probably at 7:15, sunset being at 6 : 30.The total time of the march was about 7 hours.The total distance traveled to the lower bridge (K)was, according to our map, 11 miles. It is pos-sible that a detailed survey of the field would in-dicate the distance as somewhat greater. GeneralWallace estimates it as “ over 14 miles, of whichquite 5 miles were through mire so deep that theaxles of my guns left wakes behind them as ifmud-scows had been dragged that way.” Cap-tain Brown, who studied the route in 1884, esti-mates it at between 13 and 14 miles. Not con-sidering the comparative difficulties of the twomarches, the map indicates little difference in theVOL. I. 39,
speed of Wallace ’s division and that of Nelson’sleading brigade (Ammen) from Savannah to Pitts-burg Landing (1:30 to 5). Ammen in his diarydwells on the extreme difficulties of his route, whichlay largely through swamps impassable by artillery.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY GENERAL WALLACE .
I. — Letter found on the person of General W. H.
L. Wallace , after he had received a mortal woundat Shiloh, and sent by his widow to General Grant[see foot-note, page 468; printed also in TheCentury and in the “ Personal Memoirs of U. S.Grant”]:
“ Headquarters Third Division, Adamsville, April5th, 1862. General W. H. L. Wallace , commanding Sec-ond Division. Sir: Yours received. Glad to hear fromyou. My cavalry from this point has been to and fromyour post frequently. As my Third Brigade is here, fivemiles from Crump’s Landing, my Second two and a halfmiles from it, I thought it would be better to open com-munication with you from Adamsville. I will to-morroworder Major Hayes, of the 5th Ohio Cavalry, to report toyou at your quarters; and, if you are so disposed, prob-ably you had better send a company to return with him,that they may familiarize themselves with the road, toact in case of emergency as guides to and from ourcamps.—I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,Lewis Wallace , General Third Division.”
General Wallace says : u As I was ignorant of theposition of W. H. L. Wallace ’s camp, this letter wassent by way of Owl Creek. I knew Wallace , and didnot know Sherman, whose camp was nearer.”
II. —Letter from General Grant to General LewWallace , in 1868, after examining statements bythe latter and by the following officers of his com-mand, touching the character of the order andmarch: Generals Fred. Knefler, George F. Mc-Ginnis, Daniel Macauley, Silas A. Strickland, John
M. Thayer , Colonel James R. Ross, and Captain Ad-dison Ware:
“ Headquarters Army of TnE United States, Wash-ington, D. C. , March 10th, 1868. My Dear General:Inclosed herewith I return you letters from officers ofthe army who served with you at the battle of Shiloh,Tennessee , giving their statement of your action onthat occasion. I can only state that my orders to youwere given verbally to a staff-officer to communicate,and that they were substantially as given by GeneralBadeau in his book. I always understood that the staff-officer referred to, Captain Baxter, made amemorandumof the orders he received, and left it with you. Thatmemorandum I never saw.
“ The statements which I now return seem to exoner-ate you from the great point of blame, your taking thewrong road, or different road from the one directed,from Crump’s Landing to Pittsburg Landing. All yoursubsequent military career showed you active and readyin the execution of every order you received. Yourpromptness in moving from Baltimore to Monocacy,Maryland , in 1864, and meeting the enemy :'n force farsuperior to your own when Washington was threat-ened, is a case particularly in point. There you couldscarcely have hoped for a victory, but you delayed theenemy, and enabled me to get troops from City Point,Virginia, in time to save the city. That act I regardedas most praiseworthy. I refer you to my report of 1865,touching your course there. In view of the assaultmade upon you now, I think it due to you that youshould publish what your own staff and other subordi-nate officers have to say in exoneration of your course.—Yours truly, U. S. Grant, General.
4gMu -