628

THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.

like a house, in straight lines and with pointed ends. Though there wasapparently no lack of steamers to tow the unfinished vessel up the river, shewas burnt just before the Federal fleet reached the city.

The total failure of the Confederate fleet on the Mississippi was largely dueto bad management and to the want of a proper organization. Authority wasdivided between the State Government and the Confederate Government,and still further between the army, the navy, and the steamboat captains.The War and Navy Departments at Richmond did not work together. Therewere some differences of opinion between General Lovell, in command atNew Orleans , and General Duncan, in command of the exterior defenses.Four naval officers, Rousseau , Hollins, Mitchell, and Whittle, were succes-sively in command of the “ Naval Station,” a command of vague and inde-terminate limits, and there were plenty of sources of disagreement betweenthem and their colleagues of the army. They were perplexed and worriedby confusing orders, and by the presence of independent agents in their ownfield of operations. They had no authority over the work of building theiron-clads, although constantly urged to hurry their completion. The organ-ization of the River Defense Fleet, under Montgomery , was a direct andintentional blow at their authority, and left them without the aid of reserveswhose disposition they could direct. The naval operations suffered from thelack of funds, so much so that on the 26th of February Governor Mooretelegraphed to Richmond , “ The Navy Department here owes nearly amillion. Its credit is stopped.” This condition of affairs was all the moreremarkable, since the strategic position of New Orleans and the river wasof vital importance to the Confederacy, and the post required above allthings unity of command,—indeed, one might well say a dictatorship. Hadone man of force and discretion been in full command and provided withsufficient funds, the defense would at least not have presented a spectacle ofcomplete collapse.

The construction and equipment of vessels for the Confederate Govern-ment at other points were executed with great difficulty, owing to the wantof iron and the absence of properly equipped workshops. In 1861 the onlyfoundry or rolling-mill of any size in the Confederacy was the Tredegar IronWorks, at Richmond , and here the principal work in ordnance and armor wasdone. By dint of great efforts, foundries and rolling-mills were establishedat Selma, Atlanta , and Macon; smelting-works and a rope-walk at Peters-burg; a powder-mill at Columbia, and an ordnance-foundry and chemicalworks at Charlotte. These works supplied what was needed in the wayof ordnance and equipment, but they could not build vessels. The springof 1862 saw the loss of Norfolk, Pensacola, and New Orleans , and afterthis date the Confederacy had no well-appointed ship-yard. Neverthe-less, numerous contracts were entered into with business firms all overthe country, and the construction of small vessels went on activelyduring the war. On March 15th, 1861, the Provisional Congress hadauthorized the construction or purchase of 10 steam gun-boats, of from750 to 1000 tons. By the latter part of 1862 the Navy Department had