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of one of its vessels. A short time before sunset the Confederate boats camenear enough to fire a few more shots, but were again driven off, this timemaking their last appearance as a fleet.
During the fight between the forts and the vessels the army transport fleetwas at anchor about three miles to the south, prepared for landing. A littleafter 4 o’clock the troops began to land, General Foster’s brigade takingthe lead, followed by Reno’s and Parke’s. By 10 o’clock a force of about7500 strong had been landed. One of the two sections of a boat-gunbattery manned by men of the Union Coast Guard, in charge of MidshipmanPorter, was stationed well out to the front, supported by the 21st Massa-chusetts ; the other troops bivouacked in an open field, where before morningthey were thoroughly drenched by a most uncomfortable cold rain.
The morning was cold and cheerless and the breakfast was poor, butthe troops were in fine spirits. Foster was the first to move, the 25thMassachusetts in the advance, followed by Midshipman Porter’s guns. Theenemy’s pickets gradually retired into an earth-work mounting three guns,situated in the center of a morass, flanked on each side by an almostimpenetrable swamp, and protected in front by an open field of deep mud,in part covered by fallen trees with their limbs cut short and sharpened.
General Foster, as soon as he reached the earth-work, placed his troops andthe boat-guns in position, and by 8 o’clock the attack had commenced inearnest. But no effective work was done until General Reno came up andwith the 21st Massachusetts, the 51st New York, and the 9th New Jersey began his effective attack upon the Confederate right. With great diffi-culty he penetrated the swamp, covered with its thick interwoven growth ofbriers, shrubs, and trees. At length he succeeded in delivering his fire from
the hope of drawing the enemy under the fire of FortsHuger and Forrest; hut as they did not attempt to ad-vance, and evidently had no intention of passing theobstructions, we took up our first position and kept itduring the day. At 2 p. m. the firing was hot and heavy,and continued so until sunset. Our gunners had had nopractice with their rifled guns, and our firing was notwhat it should have been. It was entirely too rapid,and not particularly accurate. Early in the fight theForrest was disabled in her machinery, and her gallantyoung captain, Lieutenant Hoole, badly wounded in thehead by a piece of shell. She got in under Fort Forrestand anchored. Some time in the afternoon, in the hot-test of the fire, reenforcements arrived from Wise’s bri-gade, and were landed on the island. The RichmondBlues, Captain O. Jennings Wise, were, I think, a partof this force. Pork Point Battery kept up a constantfire on the fleet, and the enemy could not silence it. Thegarrison stood to their guns like men, encouraged by thespirited example of their instructor, Lieutenant B. P.Loyall. Forts Huger and Forrest did not fire, the ene-my being out of range; but the small battery betweenPork Point and AVeir’s Point fired an occasional gunduring the day. Toward 4 o’clock in the afternoon ashot or shell struck the hurricane-deck of the Curlew[Captain Hunter] in its descent, and went through herdecks and bottom as though they had been made ofpaper. Hunter put hie vessel ashore, immediately infront of Fort Forrest, completely masking its guns,and we could not fire her for fear of burning up thebattery, which, as I have said, was built on an oldcanal-boat. . . . We, in the Beaufort , did our best inmaintaining our position. About 4 p. m. I observed
that the enemy’s troops were landing to the south-ward of Pork Point, under the guns of a division oftheir fleet, and could not perceive that any successfulresistance was being made to it. A little after sunsetthe firing ceased on both sides, and as we felt sure theenemy would not attempt to pass the obstructions bynight, as he had declined to attempt them by day, weran in and anchored under Fort Forrest. . . . Soonafter we anchored signal was made by the flag-ship forthe captains to report on board. Upon my entering thecabin I was informed by Commodore Lynch that wemust retreat from Roanoke Island . Much surprised andmortified, I asked why, and was told that the vesselsgenerally were out of ammunition. A council was heldas to whether the vessels should retreat to Norfolk ,through the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal, or go toElizabeth City, on the Pasquotank River. We wouldhave saved the vessels by goingto the former place, butthe commodore’s orders were to do his utmost to defendthe waters of North Carolina ; so we decided to go to thelatter, where it was understood a fort had been built toprotect the town. Elizabeth City was the terminus ofthe Dismal Swamp Canal, and we hoped to get ammuni-tion that way from Norfolk in time to act in conjunctionwith the fort. I was sent to Roanoke Island to commu-nicate all this to Colonel Shaw, and confess did not relishmy mission. It looked too much like leaving the armyin the lurch, and yet to have remained without ainmu-nition would have been mere folly. . . . I met ColonelShaw at his quarters, and stated the facts in relation tothe vessels, and then returned to the Beaufort. A 11 lightswere now extinguished, and the squadron got underway for Elizabeth City.”