MCCLELLAN ORGANIZING THE GRAND ARMY.

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McClellan. The latter, on the other hand, seemed to imagine that the with-drawal of the old warrior removed the last remaining obstacle to the realiza-tion of his vast strategic conceptions. But, as is not seldom the case inthe course of human events, both these expectations were mistaken. Inbrief, McClellan, once invested with supreme command, proved himselfmore of a temporizer than his predecessor, and, as will soon be seen, hispremature promotion to this post was the cause of all his subsequent morti-fication and misfortune.

The next day (November 2d), at 4 o’clock in the morning, we were athis side, mounted, to accompany to the railway station the commanderwhose place McClellan was about to occupy. As we went along every onechatted about the matter, and sought to penetrate the future and to divinethe fortunes and role of the young general in the terrible crisis throughwhich the republic was passing. It would have been easier to pierce thenight and fog which enveloped us. An hour later McClellan was at hisoffice. A new task of enormous proportions, whose difficulty he had not,perhaps, paused to contemplate, stared him in the face, and threatened himwith destruction. Without giving him the full rank enjoyed by Scott, thePresident had given him full command of the armies of the republic. Itshould be said that he had the right to this position as the oldest major-general of the regular army. In assuming his new function he did not giveup his own personal and particular direction of the Army of the Potomac.Here he was right; for he could neither have found any one to whom hemight safely confide his own proper work of organization, nor could he haveleft the command of the first army of the republic without condemning him-self to perpetual prison in the bureau at Washington.

It must be admitted, however, that his two functions were incompatible.As an old French proverb has it, u Qui trop embrasse , mal etreint .” When,two years later, Grant himself undertook to conduct the decisive campaignagainst Richmond, at the same time continuing the direction in chief of all thear mi es of the Union, he was not only surrounded by the aureole of his splendidvictories and incontestable military authority, and not only had a cruel experi-ence proved to the people the necessity for concentrating the military powerin the hands of one man, but the different armies which he controlled wereconfided to approved chiefs whom he could trust with perfect liberty ofaction, while, in case of need, he might leave at the head of the Army of thePotomac the conqueror of Gettysburg. In Washington, Halleck presidedas chief of staff, reduced by Grant to a subordinate function, it is true, buta function for which he possessed special aptitude. The situation of Mc-Clellan was different. He perceived this on the day when, entering on thecampaign, he placed himself at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Atfirst he was equal to the emergency by dint of incessant work; but he wasobliged to renounce the daily routine which had served to maintain his rela-tions with all his divisions, and had contributed to facilitate and hastenforward his schemes of organization. McClellan, confined to his office,undertook the orderly and methodical concentration of the immense number