MCCLELLAN ORGANIZING THE GRAND ARMY.

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Washington of the incident afterward known as the Trent affair [see p. 134].. . . The capture of the Confederate Commissioners on the high seas undera neutral flag, in flagrant violation of the law of nations,— a violation brutalin its method and useless in its results, most dangerous in its consequences,—was hailed "by public opinion as a splendid victory for the Stars and Stripes.... Two men at Washington comprehended from the first the danger totheir country of the inconsiderate act of Wilkes: these were Seward andMcClellan. The former, burdened with an immense responsibility, patriot-ically dissimulated his opinion with extraordinary finesse; he permitted theexcitement to spend itself, and, thanks to the slowness of communication withEngland, gained time enough ]) to extricate his Government at the criticaljuncture, by enveloping the decision he had succeeded in extorting from “ thepowers that be ” in a specious web of plausibilities, calculated to sweeten thebitterness caused at home by England’s exactions, and at the same time tosatisfy her just demands. He succeeded in sparing his country and the worldthe horrors of a war the results of which could hardly be imagined. . . .

It was not for McClellan to implicate himself in questions of a purelypolitical character, but he probably foresaw the consequences of a war inwhich England, mistress of the seas, would have inundated the SouthernStates with arms and munitions of war, with money and volunteers, block-ading the Federal ports, and in the spring making Canada the base ofoperations for her regular army. The States of the North would havefound themselves hemmed in along a vast line of boundary by two hostilepowers, extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific. McClellan’s care, inview of such an emergency, was to perfect and strengthen his army; but,above all, not to compromise the safety of his forces by any attempt at opera-tions on the other side of the Potomac. Grand reviews established, to thesatisfaction of the inexperienced, the fact of progress in the equipment,instruction, and drill of the troops. At Bailey’s Cross-roads might have beenseen a rendezvous of 50,000 men, with all the paraphernalia of a campaign, alarge number of cavalry, and a formidable array of artillery. No suchspectacle had ever been seen in the United States ; the novelty of the dis-play caused the liveliest interest among the inhabitants of Washington. Butto a European, not the least curious part of the pageant was the President,with his entire Cabinet, in citizens’ dress, boldly caracoling at the head of abrilliant military cortege , and riding down the long lines of troops to the rat-tle of drums, the flourish of trumpets, and the loud huzzas of the whole army.While his aides-de-camp were engaged in the field, McClellan worked cease-lessly with the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, Simon Cameron and GideonWelles , preparing great expeditions, half military and half naval, that shouldplant the national flag on the principal points of the enemy’s coast, and secureconvenient bases for future operations. The success won at Port Royalencouraged the Federal Government in these projects. McClellan himselfhad brought back from the Crimea a personal experience which enabled him,better than any one else, to preside over the details of preparation.

Seward’s letter consenting to the return of the Commissioners bears date of Dee. 26, 1861.— Editors.